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ABSTRACT
This thesis proposes a performance regime structure for public transit
concession contracts, designed so incentives to the concessionaire can be
effective given significant uncertainty about the future operating conditions. This
is intended to aid agencies in designing regimes that will encourage continually
improving performance through the use of relevant and adaptive incentives. The
proposed incentives are adjusted annually based on actual circumstances. An
adaptive regime can also allow the incentives to be more cost and resource
efficient and is especially well-suited to so-called "gross-cost" contracts when the
public agency retains the fare revenue and absorbs the revenue risk for the
services.
The motivation for this research is the anticipated transfer of the oversight
responsibilities for the Silverlink Metro regional rail services, in outer London,
from the UK Department for Transport to Transport for London. This new service
will undergo substantial infrastructure and service upgrades in the next several
years and an innovative operating contract is required to maintain and improve
service levels during this transitional period.
The Proposed performance regime is composed of two major components:
1. A "bundled" set of specific performance measures based on which the
concessionaire can earn annual bonuses or incur penalties based on a
set of adaptive targets; and
2. An excess revenue and/or ridership incentive which is designed to
capture all of the intangible actions that a concessionaire can bring to
bear to produce more effective service.
Together these components should encourage concessionaires to improve upon
the major aspects of service under their control as well as pay close attention to
strategies which can alter the quality and effectiveness of service. Additionally,
the performance regime proposed is expected to provide efficient incentives so
that a better overall outcome for the public will result.
Thesis Supervisor: Nigel H. M. Wilson
Title: Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering
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Chapter 1: Introduction
This thesis proposes a performance regime structure for public transit
concession contracts, designed so incentives to the concessionaire can be
effective given significant uncertainty about the future conditions. Because it is
important to deal with unexpected conditions so service quality can be
maintained, this work intends to aid agencies in designing regimes that will
encourage continually improving performance through the use of relevant and
adaptive incentives. An adaptive regime can also allow the incentives to be more
cost and resource efficient.
1.1 BACKGROUND
A trend towards privatization began in the post World War 11 era and became
more dominant in the 1980's and 1990's, where "privatization is the process of
transferring property from public ownership to private ownership and/or
transferring the management of a service or activity from the government to the
private sector" (Wikipedia, 2006). Forms of privatization have been used to
restructure a range of government services, from energy provision to health and
education programs. The deregulation of the bus industry in the United Kingdom
in the 1980's is credited as the first major privatization of urban transit services.
Before deregulation of the UK bus industry, British public transport was provided
entirely by the government. Like most American systems today, all infrastructure
and assets in pre-reform UK was publicly-owned, and all services publicly
managed and operated. The British government, under Margaret Thatcher,
initiated a program to privatize the provision of bus services in order to achieve
reductions in the subsidy those services required, expecting little to no negative
effect on quality of services (Rye & Wilson). Deregulation in the United Kingdom
took on a different form for systems outside the Greater London metropolitan
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area than the structure used for the London network where quality of service
concerns meant greater central control was needed.
The British Rail system was also restructured beginning in 1993, following the
replacement of the Thatcher government by Major. The Railways Act 1993 was
passed entailing the "disintegration of the British Railway Board's activities into
100 separate parts, each one to be sold or franchised (The National Archives,
2004). Where previously, the British Railway Board's (BRB) activities were to
provide "railway service in Great Britain and, in connection with the provision of
the railway services, to provide such other services and facilities as appear to the
Board to be expedient" according to the Transport Act 1972, under the Railways
Act 1993 "engineering functions and rolling stock were sold, train operation was
franchised, and ownership of the infrastructure, such as track, signalling and
stations, was passed onto a new organisation, Railtrack, which was formed as a
separate company in 1994, and was privatised in 1996" (The National Archives,
2004). All relationships between the 100 new successor companies were
controlled by legal contracts and supervised by the Office of the Rail Regulator
and, in the case of the passenger railway, the Office of Passenger Rail
Franchising (OPRAF) (Wikipedia, 2006).
In 1997, with the election of the Labour Party, management of the national rail
network was again restructured. Under the new administration, the OPRAF was
replaced by the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA) in 2001. As well as providing
overall strategic direction and leadership for Britain's railway, the SRA was to let
and manage passenger franchises, develop and sponsor major infrastructure
projects, manage freight grants, publish an annual Strategic Plan, and be
responsible for some aspects of consumer protection (SRA, 2005). The Labour
Party also intervened "in the wake of the Hatfield rail crash in 2000 as Railtrack
entered into financial meltdown" (Wikipedia, 2006). This intervention led to the
creation of Network Rail, a publicly owned company operated as a private
enterprise, that took over ownership and maintenance of the track and
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infrastructure. While Network Rail is currently intact, the Strategic Rail Authority
has now been wound up with many of its functions passed to the Department for
Transport's new Rail Group" (SRA, 2005).
In contrast to the U.K. bus industry (including until recently London Bus), the
privatization of British Rail was accompanied by substantial Central Government
subsidies to the private sector along with the transfer of many valuable assets.
A range of deregulation schemes were developed as reform began to spread to
other countries, each possessing their own reasons for greater inclusion of the
private sector. As governments relinquished some aspects of control, a variety
of arrangements regarding ownership and responsibility were fashioned.
Ownership of infrastructure or rolling stock, maintenance, fare-setting, and
service and schedule planning are a few of the responsibilities that are entrusted
to the government agency, a single contractor, or multiple contractors in different
combinations, depending on the characteristics of the transport system and the
public authority.
Full deregulation, at one end of the privatization spectrum, is a complete
"dismantling of a comprehensive system of government control" (Kahn, 2002). In
terms of transportation services, full deregulation can mean a removal of all
government restrictions on business, including barriers to entry, minimum service
levels, or required infrastructure investment in order to increase efficiency and
competition. Because regional development is closely linked with the quality and
scope of transportation systems, governments typically employ forms of
privatization where some regulatory power is retained.
Other forms of privatization allow government agencies to oversee services
"contracted-out" to the private sector. For example, many agencies have found it
advantageous to pay private companies to provide the tangible transit services
while the agency maintains planning and administrative control of such aspects
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as routes, schedules and fares. This approach establishes "a government
regulatory agency that has the discretion to unilaterally change tariffs and other
terms of service" (Gomez-Ibanez, 2004). While this method provides for greater
government control and "flexibility: there is no need to foresee and prepare
contingencies for all important future events because the regulatory agency has
the discretion to deal with the unanticipated", allowing complete discretionary
power to any entity can be disadvantageous. Contractors may view the
government's unilateral ability to change contract terms as a risk, or discretionary
agencies may "be "captured" by "special" interests that prevent it from striking an
appropriate balance between consumer and investor concerns" (Gomez-Ibanez,
2004).
Business relationships between a private provider and government oversight
agency are often governed by concession contracts rather than discretionary
control. A concession contract defines the roles of both the private company and
government agency and attempts to make clear the obligations of each entity in a
manner which is enforceable by law. Contracts for transit service are usually
made public so qualified and willing operators can bid on tenders, allowing for
"managed-competition". "Concession contracts are enormously appealing
because they promise to limit opportunistic behavior by the private infrastructure
provider and the government and because competitive bidding can insure that
the terms are fair' (Gomez-Ibanez, 2004). However concession contracts do not,
in and of themselves, ensure a spirit of cooperation, improved quality of service,
appropriate compensation to the contractor, or a good deal for the public.
One of the most significant hindrances to creating an effective arrangement is the
inherent difference in objectives of the government agency and the private
contractor. While the contractor's main goal is usually to maximize short-term
and long-term profitability, the agency's goal is generally to efficiently provide
valuable public services. Since many public services have social value but are
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not commercial, the fundamental goals of the authority and concessionaire are
inherently conflicting.
One option for dealing with divergent interests is for the managing agency to
specify, in the contract, all aspects of service provision. This method, however,
does not provide for contractor independence of action and effectively negates
any opportunity for private sector innovation or efficiency gains. A better
alternative is to include incentives within concession contracts to encourage the
achievement of goals set forth by the oversight agency. Because a concession
contract binds the public agency and the private provider, it is the best vehicle for
aligning both sets of interests, specifically by rewarding the concessionaire
financially if it provides the most valuable service for the public. In this way, the
profit and welfare maximizing goals of the concessionaire and agency,
respectively, can be harmonized.
A contractually stipulated performance regime is a potentially effective model for
providing incentives to concessionaires. In a performance regime, the
government authority sets forth their objectives, defines how progress towards
those objectives will be measured and provides monetary or non-monetary
incentives for accomplishment by the contractor (United Nations, 1997). The
contractor is then given the freedom to determine the appropriate means for
achieving these objectives. Not only does the contractor have the power and
motivation to help achieve the public's goals in the most efficient manner, but
new and innovative strategies can be gleaned in the process.
There are also other advantages that can result from the use of incentive
contracts. For instance, these contracts can foster a more collaborative
relationship between the government agency and private providers, so both
parties can focus on obtaining the best outcomes for the public. Also, a contract
from which motivated contractors can earn bonuses may increase interest and
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competition during the bidding phase, and can encourage innovative and efficient
operators to compete.
1.2 OBJECTIVES
While, theoretically, performance regimes can perfectly meld public interest and
the contractor's actions, the application of performance regimes in the real world
is far from perfect. Within a political environment and with asymmetric
information, opportunism, and uncertainty about future conditions, it is impossible
to specify the ideal performance regime. Specification is further complicated
since neither the contractor nor the governing agency has full control over all
aspects affecting outcomes. Outside factors, including competing services, play
an enormous and unpredictable role in the outcomes of the concession
agreement.
Ultimately, the objective of this thesis is to propose a performance regime
structure which can support the effective and efficient achievement of the public's
goals for transit, during periods of uncertainty and ambiguity, when the
government retains some portion of control over service. Ideally this will lead to
a collaborative relationship between the concessionaire and the authority,
encourage the concessionaire to be continually innovative and to be of a "frame-
of-mind" that provides for the desired development of the network, and minimize
payments to the concessionaire, all important objectives in developing the
performance regime.
The need for this research was first identified through consideration of potential
performance regimes for the North London Railway contract for service. This
new service, beset by unpredictable future conditions, requires an innovative
performance regime structure in order to be both effective and efficient.
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1.3 CONTRACTING FOR NORTH LONDON RAILWAY SERVICE
In late 2005, an agreement in principle was reached between the central
government's Department for Transport (DfT) and Transport for London (TfL) to
transfer the existing Silverlink Metro service in Greater London to TfL's control, in
exchange for TfL's promise to invest in the service, procure a new private
operator, and upgrade its service levels. The new service is to be renamed the
North London Railway (NLR) in deference to the fact that portions of the
Silverlink service further from London would remain under DfT control'. As this
would be the initial regional rail service to be operated under TfL oversight, and
its service characteristics were likely to be significantly different from existing TfL
Underground and light rail services, it was determined that a new contract
performance regime should be considered.
1.3.1 Background
The Silverlink Metro service which is slated to become the North London Railway
is a London regional rail service, with three of four lines covering key orbital
routes around the West, North and East of London and one inner suburban radial
route (see Figure 1-1). Together it spans one-third of the most deprived wards in
London. Although 17% of Londoners live within a 15 minute walk of a Silverlink
Metro station, Silverlink trains are comprised of only two or three coaches and
are currently run at 15 or 30 minute intervals (Transport for London, 2005). Some
of the track is shared with freight and other rail services, and capacity is
constrained by outdated signal systems. As a result, trains are severely
overcrowded during peak periods. In addition to poor levels of service, survey
results indicate that many passengers are concerned for their personal security
while using Silverlink Metro facilities (Transport for London, 2005).
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The portion of Silverlink service to be transferred to TfL oversight are the four lines making up
Silverlink Metro service (Euston-Watford, West London, Barking and North London) with
Silverlink county commuter services remaining under the SRA.
Silverlink Metro is a loss-making service which is currently run by National
Express Group, a private concessionaire, under the oversight of the Department
for Transport (DfT). The average subsidy required, on the four lines combined, is
currently -35 million per year.
Assets include 50 stations in generally neglected condition and 32 carriages
which are beyond their design life. The service is staffed by 500 employees,
although staff presence at stations is minimal (Transport for London, 2005).
Combined with low staff levels, the lack of fare gates at most stations has
resulted in levels of ticketless travel estimated at up to 40%. This level of
ticketless travel has negative effects on both revenue and passengers'
perceptions of security.
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Figure 1-1: Silverlink Metro Rail Lines Map (Transport for London, 2005)
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In 2005 TfL began working with the DfT on a plan to transfer oversight
responsibilities for the Silverlink Metro to TfL and rename the service the North
London Railway. TfL would take over control of the service only if it could
substantially improve the service, resulting in an allowance of E250 million in
investment.
Transport for London's acquisition of the Silverlink service, as well as the
sizeable investment program are meant to accomplish a myriad of goals. Among
the most important of these is to improve the access from deprived
neighborhoods to new and growing areas of employment and contribute to the
Mayor's goals of regeneration, integration, and accessibility to the Thames
Gateway (Transport for London, 2005). Because of the potential to increase
capacity on Silverlink Metro services, a second goal is to reduce overcrowding on
parts of London's heavily stressed Underground network. Third, TfL's
management of Silverlink service would be a first step in a partial TfL take-over
of the London regional portion of the National Rail Network, to achieve better
integration across modes and for the creation of OrbiRail, an orbital London
railway (Transport for London, 2005). The outcomes of the Silverlink Metro
acquisition, then, will influence the future of Transport for London's role in the
management of regional rail services as well as the public transport system as a
whole.
Among the improvements to be made, as part of the £250 million investment
package, are:
- E30 million in station improvements including real-time customer
information, security and gate enhancements,
- E100 million in new, larger trains,
- E100 million in service capacity improvements to provide twice the current
levels of service,
- new services and destinations, and
- additional station staff (Transport for London, 2005).
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As new trains are delivered, over an anticipated one to two year period, service
frequency is expected to increase on the Euston-Watford line from three to six
trains an hour, from two to four trains per hour on both the West London and
Barking lines, and from four to eight trains per hour on the North London line.
Additionally, fares are expected to decrease since they will be brought into
compliance with London Underground standards.
Representing the first step in a restructuring of London's rail transport network, it
is clear that the new service to be run on the North London Railway, including the
nature of the relationship between TfL and the concessionaire, will receive
considerable attention. Because of the high level of investment, in terms of both
capital and oversight effort, London's government and the public will expect clear
and substantial benefits from the new service. Consequently, it is important for
TfL to overcome the obstacles associated with transitional services in a manner
that is both transparent and effective.
1.3.2 Responsibility Allocation
Monitoring the effectiveness of the planned investment is complicated by a
sharing of the right-of-way between passenger and freight services. The owner
of the National Rail track is Network Rail, a private organization created by the
SRA that acts as a commercial business. Network Rail has the responsibility to
maintain and improve track conditions, signaling systems, 40,000 bridges and
tunnels and 17 of the largest National Rail stations. In addition to providing the
timetables for passenger and freight operators, Network Rail manages the signal
system, guiding the movement of 25,000 trains a day. "All of Network Rail's
profits are reinvested into maintaining and upgrading the rail infrastructure"
(Network Rail, 2004).
Transport for London will manage all strategic planning and investment while
contracting out the day-to-day operations of the NLR. This means that in
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addition to schedule planning and fare setting, all major decisions regarding
investment of E250 million will be made by the authority. These decisions
include the timing, procurement and selection of sub-contractors, and design
oversight. Because the service is largely specified by Transport for London, the
agency has decided to take the revenue risk and hence will receive the fare
revenue. Since TfL will specify the service and given that there is significant
uncertainty in terms of ridership, retention by TfL of the revenue risk is clearly
appropriate.
In addition to providing the levels of service specified by TfL, the selected
concessionaire will have an increased share of responsibility due to the
magnitude of changes that will take place concurrently with service provision.
For example, the operator will need to work with TfL and its selected contractors
to minimize the risk of service disruption. The concessionaire is also expected to
assist in the implementation of changes to service. Although the operator leases
the Network Rail owned infrastructure assets, the contractor will take part in
processes that will have a lasting effect on the infrastructure as well as on
service quality on the line. While the concessionaire is given an atypically large
share of power over the outcomes, by normal TfL standards, there is a relatively
small set of actions available to the service provider for achievement of the
desired long-term goals. The contract structure, specifically the performance
regime, can help to encourage the concessionaire to excel and, in turn, aid in the
attainment of the TfL's goals for this service.
1.4 APPROACH
In order to specify a new performance regime structure an examination of the key
issues regarding performance contracting under uncertainty will first be
completed for the NLR. A survey of current practice and related research can
exemplify the relationship between the authority and the concessionaire and the
role of the contract for service.
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This work builds on previous reseach by Raspall Galli, which explores the
relationships between the contracting government agency and stakeholders of
the transit service with regard to the outcome of the concession. Raspall Galli's
work, and other resources that describe the transit contracting environment, are
used to gain an understanding of how the contracting process works today.
These concepts are then employed to determine the desired characteristics of
North London Railway's performance regime, as well as formulate alternative
approaches to regime design which are likely to achieve the desired
characteristics.
To evaluate alternative structures, a simple computer model is developed to
assess whether a proposed performance regime can respond in the desired way
to common real world issues and scenarios.
The results of that evaluation process yield a performance regime structure
capable of responding in the desired manner to potential obstacles encountered
during the NLR concession. The findings from the design process are
generalized for transit concession contracts facing significant uncertainty and
aiming to achieve a high level of concessionaire performance.
1.5 ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
In Chapter 2, the basics of a concession contract are presented along with
definitions of the elements of a performance regime and the relationships among
them. Chapter 3 reviews case studies of recent experience with concession
contracts emphasizing their strengths and weaknesses. This review highlights
the need for development of more innovative performance regime structures.
The desired characteristics of the new performance regime are also presented in
Chapter 3. Chapter 4 presents the proposed adaptive performance regime for
19
transit concession contracts, and explains the evaluation process that motivated
the proposed design. Some considerations related to the implementation of the
proposed performance regime are presented in Chapter 5. Finally, in Chapter 6,
the contributions of this thesis are summarized along with suggestions for further
research.
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Chapter 2: The Basics of Concession Contracts
This chapter introduces and defines key terms and concepts which are
fundamental to concession contracts. Specifically, the key concepts of the risk
and responsibility allocation are introduced in section 2.1, followed by a
description of the basic forms of contract structure in section 2.2, and a theory on
incentive contract optimization (section 2.3). The elements of a performance
regime are defined in section 2.4 and the potential performance measures for the
NLR contract are examined in section 2.5. The differences between bus and rail,
which are relevant to concession contracts, are described in section 2.6.
2.1 RISK AND RESPONSIBILITY ALLOCATION
As part of contract specification, responsibility for operating, maintaining and
planning transit systems must be assigned and associated risks allocated
between the agency and concessionaire. "The choices made at this stage affect
the structure and character of the [contractual] relationship in ways that may be
difficult to change later in the process" (Cooper, 2003). In the transit industry,
responsibilities include infrastructure and rolling stock acquisition and
maintenance, strategic planning, route and schedule planning, service operation,
marketing, fare setting, training and maintaining staff, and data collection.
Because the oversight agency is accountable to the public for the quality of the
transit network far into the future, it almost always retains ownership of the
infrastructure and a portion of the planning responsibilities. Agency specified
minimum levels of service, fare levels, and route alignment can ensure that the
public's vision for the transport system is realized, and are recommended for
efficient accomplishment of long-term goals. However, the private
concessionaire has the first-hand knowledge of service operations and the nature
of demand. Because this first-hand knowledge may not be available within the
agency, concessionaires should be allowed an active role in service planning.
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While it is clear that service provision will be delegated to the concessionaire,
and that long-range planning and infrastructure ownership should be retained by
the government, "determination of whether the agency or the contractor
maintains the vehicles, other equipment, and facilities required to provide the
contracted service" (Halvorsen, 1995) is necessary. A contract arrangement
where service operations and maintenance of vehicles or infrastructure is
handled by a single concessionaire is termed "vertically-bundled", whereas a
horizontal approach to privatization awards contracts for maintenance and
operations independently. While vertical bundling may improve accountability
and service quality, when compared to a horizontal approach, there is cost
associated with the additional "capital that a contractor must expend to enter into
a contract and the risk of damage or wear to equipment and facilities in the
absence of specific enforceable contract provisions" (Halvorsen, 1995). The
additional cost and risk experienced by the concessionaire in vertically-bundled
arrangements may result in increased bid prices during contract procurement.
In fact, greater risk is not normally accepted by any entity unless the potential
rewards make the venture worthwhile, implying higher agency costs for risks
borne by the concessionaire. A government too eager to transfer risks to the
concessionaire "can create the false economy of appearing to protect the public
while in reality reducing competitive options and driving up costs" (Cooper,
2003). The agency determines which entity will shoulder any risk, usually by
determining the party most capable of controlling those risks. Generally, an
entity is better able to control a risk if it is responsible for the relevant activities
and equipped to deal with the external factors that may affect outcomes.
Revenue and operational cost risks are the two most important types of risk in
transportation contracting. Risks related to the cost of operations are typically
allocated to the concessionaire. If the concessionaire is not expected to maintain
costs below some predetermined level, there is little motivation for increased
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operational efficiency. Revenue risk, on the other hand, may be maintained by
the government agency. Especially when the agency is responsible for
specifying fare and service levels, they will control most of the aspects of service
which determine revenue. Awarding a share of the profit to concessionaires may
encourage operators to focus on customer satisfaction and/or ridership, and
agencies should arrange some form of revenue sharing if the agency retains the
risk. Revenue risk should not be delegated to concessionaires unless an agency
is also willing to allocate significant amounts of control over service specification.
The decisions regarding risk and responsibility delegation will have an impact on
every part of a well-planned concession contract. Only after each participant is
accountable for specific activities and assigned the responsibility to deal with
specific issues which threaten the effectiveness of the operation can there be an
understanding of the roles of either the private provider or the government
agency. Once both roles are understood, better judgments about what
performance a contractor should be rewarded or penalized for versus which
aspects of service the contractor has no power to improve can be made.
Therefore, an effective performance regime will account for the responsibility and
risk allocation as is relates to the roles of the contractor and the agency.
2.2 ALTERNATIVE CONTRACT STRUCTURES
There are two general types of service contracts, gross cost and net cost.
"Under gross cost contracts, all revenues (from fares and other sources) are
transferred to the authority and the risks absorbed by the operator are confined
to those associated with the cost of operations" (Colin Buchanan and Partners).
Under net-cost contracts "the operator is entitled to all revenue (from fares and
other sources) and could bear a number of additional risks" (Colin Buchanan and
Partners).
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The major differences between the two contract structures, then, result from the
allocation of the revenue risk. While both contract types assign cost risk to the
operator, under gross cost regimes the government authority takes the revenue
risk, while the contractor takes the revenue risk in a net cost contract.
The major concern with gross cost contracting is that the profit-maximizing focus
of the private provider will be shifted away from the market and towards cost
reduction. Because it bears no revenue risk, the transit service provider need not
be concerned with increasing patronage or improving service. Gross cost
contracts are usually associated with arrangements that give little or no planning
power to the contractor. Although the operator may be in the best position to
understand the demand for the services they provide, this setup provides little
initiative for the contractor to employ that knowledge.
Pure net cost contracts, on the other hand, are more appropriate when decisions
on service and pricing rest principally with the contractor. Since the operator is
responsible for both cost and revenue risk, it is important that it retains the power
to manage the relevant hazards, through the control of aspects such as price and
supply. Although this arrangement can lead to greater efficiency, the
government agency will lose the power to provide certain socially valuable, albeit
unprofitable services. By delegating all risk to the concessionaire, the agency
loses the power to intervene if the contractor's actions are unacceptable from a
social welfare perspective.
In practice, net cost contracts are modified to reduce the contractor's risk when
the governing authority desires to retain some of the control over planning. For
example, if some of the responsibilities, such as schedule and fare setting, are
retained by the authority, a subsidy to the contractor or a floor on the return on
their investment can be contractually stipulated. In doing so, a responsible
authority accepts a portion of the risk in exchange for greater input into the
service specification.
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Pure gross cost contracts are typically adapted by including incentives for the
contractor to pay attention to service quality. Theoretically, a gross cost contract
with incentives can create an environment where it is cost-effective for the
concessionaire to take actions which increase customer satisfaction and
patronage, as long as the incentive provided is at least equal to the expected
utility to the contractor from taking any other action. Performance regimes are
the mechanism for achieving this outcome.
2.3 A THEORETICAL APPROACH TO STRUCTURING INCENTIVE CONTRACTS
For gross cost contracts with incentives, the question of how to structure the
incentives arises. Laffont and Tirole developed a theory of regulation for
contractual relationships which are characterized by information asymmetries
(Laffont & Tirole, 1993). Specifically, "the network operator has private
information about its technology and its cost-reducing effort is unobserved by the
authority" (Gagnepain and Ivaldi, 2001). According to their theory the optimal
payment from the government to the contractor, P, is given by:
P = a + (1-b) * C
Where a is a fixed payment, b is a fraction e [0,1] revealed by the concessionaire,
and C is the cost incurred by the contractor.
When b = 0, the concessionaire is reimbursed for the total cost of operations and
is paid some fee, a, for their services. This type of contract is termed, cost-plus,
and is a low-powered incentive scheme since the contractor has virtually no
motive to decrease costs. While cost plus contracts are considered inefficient,
they may result in the contractor providing a better quality of service.
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At the other extreme, when b = 1, the contract payment is fixed-price since the
contractor receives a fixed fee, a, and bears all costs related to service provision.
A fixed-price contract is the same as a pure gross cost contract, and provides a
strong incentive to keep costs low. In this case service quality may be poor.
In between cost plus and fixed price regimes are incentive contracts, where
O<b<1. Under Laffont and Tirole's welfare maximizing scheme, the authority
offers a menu of contracts corresponding to varying degrees of incentive power
and contractors choose the contract, corresponding to a value of b, which is
compatible with their efficiency level. In this way, the authority does not need to
assume the correct power of incentive since the concessionaire discloses that
information. If contractors can be encouraged to represent their efficiency level
honestly, excessive rents will be eliminated while still encouraging the contractor
to reduce costs.
Because of either practical or political infeasibility, optimal contract tendering as
described above is not practiced. Cost plus, fixed price and incentive contracts
are all used for transit service but never in the optimal sense, as an option
included in a menu of contract alternatives. Typically, one contract form is
offered for all qualified and interested contractors to bid on.
The costs associated with creating and administering a menu of contracts, is
undoubtedly a major deterrent to implementing Laffont and Tirole's theoretical
model. However, even if a variety of contract options could be offered, the
assumption that the contractor's expected utility for entering into the contract
designed for their type is greater than the expected level of utility from choosing
another contract option may not hold true in the real world. For example, if the
contractor is not bound by their response, concessionaires may "under-estimate
their costs or over-estimate their abilities, when seeking a contract, with the
expectation that the contract will be renegotiated to provide additional
compensation to the agent" (Halvorsen, 1995). Contractors can also profit from
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imitating less efficient operators if the increase in incentive power, for contracts
representing more efficient operations, does not match the increase in cost
necessary to provide service more efficiently.
In the case of incentive contracts it is typical for the authority to select the
incentive power, or b, of the contract, unilaterally without direct involvement of
the operator. An agency selected value of b may be consistent with the theory
that "the efficiency level pertains to the network itself, more than to the effect of
the manager's culture."(Gagnepain & Ivaldi, 2001) Because external factors
such as traffic congestion, conflict with labor unions and the existence of
competing modes, are characteristic of a route, selecting a fixed incentive power
for a given contract may be logical.
While the design of concessionaire specific contracts is currently implausible, the
concept that the incentive strength should match the capacity of the
concessionaire is relevant in the real world. However, as Laffont and Tirole
recognized, determination of the appropriate strength of incentive is extremely
difficult for government agencies as the private sector has no motive to disclose
the necessary information. Therefore, formulation of performance regimes
should be carefully considered in order to deal with informational asymmetries
and produce favorable outcomes.
2.4 THE ELEMENTS OF A PERFORMANCE REGIME
Each performance regime is defined by performance measures, performance
targets, bonuses and penalties, and the relations among these elements. Each
is introduced in the following sub-sections.
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2.4.1 Performance Measures
Performance measures represent aspects of service or business to be monitored
and are the indicators against which the contractor will be evaluated, according
to the stipulations of the contract. These measures, set forth in the contract,
should "have a clear and definable relationship to" agency goals as "measures
that are indirectly related to the agency's vision and goals" (Dalton) will not be as
effective a tool for realizing the desired outcomes. For transit concession
contracts where contractors retain cost risk, performance measures usually
relate to the quality of specific aspects of service, customer satisfaction,
ridership, revenue, maintenance, safety and/or data collection.
"Quality of service as perceived by passengers is often closely aligned to
reliability" (Colin Buchanan) and most performance regimes include measures of
service reliability, such as the percentage of all trips made on time and/or the
amount of cancelled service. Measures of the frequency of service, condition of
infrastructure and vehicles, and travel time may also be used to assess service
quality.
Customer satisfaction measures rate the public's perceptions of operator
performance. Where service quality indicators typically measure aspects of
service quantitatively and objectively (% of on-time journeys), customer
satisfaction measures are subjective (overall satisfaction). The public's reactions
concerning conditions on the vehicle, value for money, overall experience, driving
quality, cleanliness and other factors can be monitored either through customer
satisfaction surveys or mystery traveler surveys, "where trained staff rate quality
aspects of journeys"(Colin Buchanan).
There seems to be a strong trend towards increasing the role of quality measures
in determining the rewards paid to operators, however, some operators argue
that the key indicator of quality is the number of passengers and that this is far
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easier to measure than the above factors (Colin Buchanan). While ridership
may be easier to monitor than quality of service, the number of passengers may
not be as directly linked to concessionaire performance as is service quality.
Additionally, an improvement to customer satisfaction implies an increase in
utility for current customers independent of any attraction of new customers.
If revenue risk is retained by the government, an agency may choose to monitor
the revenue collected by concessionaires. While revenue and ridership levels
are closely related, revenue measures also encompass issues relating to fare
evasion and fare levels. Especially in gross cost contracts where
concessionaires have little incentive to collect fares or improve ridership, revenue
incentives may be essential.
Since the responsibility for planning and operating service, and accomplishing
objectives, is shared between the agency and the provider, choosing
representative and meaningful measures can be complicated. Government
agencies must be able to differentiate between aspects of performance that can
be controlled by the contractor, and performance measures that are influenced
primarily by exogenous factors or agency decisions.
Take for instance a scenario where transit and commercial trains share the same
track. In this example, a government agency manages the traffic and the
concessionaire is responsible for its own staffing levels. If service reliability is a
goal of the concession, the appropriate performance measure may not be
immediately apparent. In this case, on-time performance will be affected by
traffic prioritization established by the government agency. Concessionaire
decisions regarding the size of the "extraboard" (or number of substitute vehicle
operators who are available to cover for absent operators) will affect how many
trains are run and ultimately, service reliability. Monitoring extraboard levels
might be more effective at improving service reliability than holding the operator
responsible for the percentage of all trips made on-time. In other words,
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performance measures should be selected so only relevant factors are
considered when evaluating concessionaires, whenever possible. However,
factors like service reliability are enormously important to the quality of transit
service and furthermore, the contractor will invariably have multiple levers for
managing reliability. Providing incentives for improved service reliability may
encourage the contractor to apply every means within their power to improve
reliability and can help align the concessionaire's priorities with the agency's real
objectives for service. When deciding whether to designate the output (service
reliability), or explicitly contractor controlled aspects (extraboard levels), as the
performance measure for a particular objective, the possible impact of external
factors versus the actions available to the contractor should be weighed.
The ability of the agency to monitor the concessionaire and collect data must
also be taken into account when selecting performance measures. If the agency
cannot gather unbiased, accurate data on a performance measure, then that
measure should probably not be used to assess the concessionaire. The lack of
a dependable mechanism for monitoring performance and collecting data can
cause energy to be wasted on disputes and their resolution, rather than allowing
all involved parties to focus on improving service.
2.4.2 Performance Level Targets
Performance level targets specify a quantifiable level of a performance measure
that is expected from a concessionaire. For example, a target level for a
measure of the percent of trips made on time may be 95%. A single
performance measure can have multiple target levels for different types of
agency action. Traditionally, three types of target levels are employed:
1. Incentive Level - where performance above the target results in a bonus
to the concessionaire
2. Penalty Level - where performance below the target results in a penalty to
the concessionaire
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3. Default Level - where performance at or below the target represents a
breach in contract and may result in contract termination or other form or
regulatory action.
In some cases the incentive and penalty levels are represented by a single target
where performance above that target is rewarded and performance below the
target penalized. In other cases, a neutral zone representing a range of standard
performance separates the incentive and penalty levels, and no agency action is
required for performance within this neutral zone. Because a single point
representing average performance may be difficult to determine in certain cases,
a neutral zone can be useful for characterizing uncertainty about levels of
achievable performance.
2.4.3 Performance Target Dates
Performance target dates specify a time-frame within which to achieve target
levels of performance. Target dates can be period or event based, meaning the
expected level of performance may be required after a certain time interval (one
year) or after some event (delivery of new equipment).
2.4.4 Bonuses & Penalties
The bonus offered for surpassing a target and/or the penalty incurred for falling
short of a specified target, is the element that encourages private contractors to
perform as the government agency desires. These bonuses and penalties can
be monetary or non-monetary in nature, but they must be of value to the
concessionaire. Some examples of positive incentives are financial bonuses,
greater autonomy, and contract extension; examples of negative returns are
financial penalties, public censure, and contract termination. Again, for
incentives to be effective it is important for incentives and penalties to reflect the
level of operator effort required to achieve the associated target.
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2.4.5 Regime Specification
Finally, all the elements including: performance measures, target levels and
dates, and bonuses and penalties, are arranged into a comprehensive package
that is the performance regime. Because a performance regime usually includes
multiple measures, the specification should aim to combine all of the elements in
a way that minimizes unintended outcomes. For example, conflicting and/or
overlapping measures should be reconciled so the agency's priorities are clearly
defined.
Regime arrangement can include the weighting of each performance measure to
enable a clear evaluation of overall performance, a system for resetting the
performance targets in the later years of a contract, or rules about when and how
bonuses and penalties will be applied. Examples of regime specification from the
real world are examined in the next chapter.
2.5 PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR THE NORTH LONDON RAILWAY
As the performance regime for the proposed North London Railway (NLR) is
currently in the design phase, potential performance measures are being
examined. At this point, measures of service reliability (e.g. excess passenger
wait time and percent of cancelled trips), revenue protection (through measuring
the incidence of ticketless travel), Customer Satisfaction Survey scores, and
Mystery Shopper Survey scores, may potentially be included in the performance
regime.
Because the revenue risk is being retained by the agency, TfL is also
considering financial incentives for increased ridership, and hence revenue, to
potentially focus the concessionaire on attracting new patrons as a primary
service objective. TfL considered using customer satisfaction as a proxy for
patronage since:
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1. TfL expects some increase in ridership levels to result from the planned
public investment, and found it undesirable to reward operators for these
increases.
2. There is significant uncertainty about the service outcomes and the
increases in ridership achievable.
In order to support the "business case" for financial bonuses based on customer
satisfaction, an analysis of the relationship between customer satisfaction and
ridership in London was conducted (see Appendix A for detailed results). This
examination found that while customer satisfaction does appear to have an affect
on ridership, it is clear that the satisfaction indicators investigated (CSS scores)
explain only a small amount of the ridership variation observed. Specifically,
factors other than satisfaction account for over 90% of the variation in ridership
data. Therefore, customer satisfaction alone could not be used to assess the
concessionaire's efforts to increase patronage. The research presented in this
thesis was initiated as a result of the lack of a proportional relationship between
customer satisfaction and patronage, and the consequential need for a more
sophisticated mechanism for dealing with TfL's uncertainty regarding service
outcomes.
TfL is still considering including an incentive based on either patronage or
revenue in the NLR contract, but is considering whether a direct incentive is
necessary or appropriate, or if the other four performance measures capture all
the key drivers of demand.
2.6 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BUS AND RAIL
As bus and rail services are fundamentally different technologies and operate in
different environments, their associated performance regimes should reflect
those differences. Because rail operations and maintenance are typically more
complicated and expensive than bus operations, rail services may require a
different approach to performance evaluation and stronger incentives.
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For example, one study found rail revenues and cost to be, "on average, more
than four times those of bus systems" (Shirley & Winston, 1998). The increased
cost may be attributable to employee training, a higher range of potential costs
for maintenance and operations, and more complex transitional activities at the
end of a contract that will probably result in a smaller pool of qualified bidders
and decreased competition (Attanucci, 2006). Consequently, the cost and effort
required for improving rail operations is likely to be greater than for bus services.
As a result, incentives to rail operators should probably be higher than those
offered to bus operators.
Because rail generally carries more passengers per vehicle than bus, and
because a single breakdown on a rail line can have a much more severe impact
on subsequent trips than on a bus service, rail disruptions will tend to affect a
much larger number of passengers. This implies that the performance measures
and targets for rail operations must be carefully considered and, in the case of
uncertainty, a mechanism should be built in to adjust these components of the
performance regime based on the experience of the concessionaire in the early
years of the contract (Attanucci, 2006).
It can be argued that rail service quality can have a significantly greater impact
on ridership levels (regardless of fare levels and economic conditions) since rail
services generally always compete with a lower cost bus option, whereas bus
riders have no cheaper option except to walk or bicycle. In addition to fares,
potential riders are most likely to trade-off overall travel time reliability, sense of
safety and security, cleanliness, convenience of accessing stations, and potential
for long delays due to service disruptions when choosing a mode. Therefore, the
overall performance of staff, as well as their attitude when problems occur, can
have a greater impact on ridership than on a typical bus service so performance
measures and their associated bonuses and penalties should be selected
accordingly (Attanucci, 2006).
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Chapter 3: Case Studies of Current Practice in Concession
Contracts
Although issues, such as asymmetric information, politicized contracting
procedures, and a lack of full control over outcomes, are obstacles to the design
of an ideal performance regime, transit agencies and researchers are finding
increasingly sophisticated methods for providing efficient incentives to
contractors. As agencies improve performance monitoring, more complete
information is available and prediction of the relevant outcomes is improved.
With a better understanding of the likely outcomes, agencies are able to make
more firmly grounded decisions on contract structure.
In practice, performance regimes rely on a wealth of collected data to structure
incentives and to monitor concessionaires' performance. From benchmarking to
complex models which forecast expected conditions based on a number of
contributing parameters, tools that utilize data from prior contract experience not
only support current models, but are changing the scope of performance
contracts. Indeed, the trend in performance regimes is towards a dependence on
high-quality and robust information. In the mean time, contract designers are
formulating regimes which maximize the utility of existing data.
The case studies presented in this chapter exemplify innovative incentive
contracts within the public transport sector. These cases vary in terms of
complexity, incentive power, and effectiveness, but are meant to show a range of
interesting contract arrangements. The information presented will focus primarily
on the performance regimes included in each model's contract for service. The
three case studies are from Melbourne, Australia, Copenhagen, Denmark, and
London, England. These three cases were selected to allow for examination of a
range of concession schemes. Each city has adopted an organizational structure
and performance regime that is tailored to the specific needs of their transit
35
network. As a result, the obstacles to improved transit service and the types of
performance monitored differ in each case.
The Melbourne case deals with an expanding transit system and examines the
kinds of effort and types of incentives that are relevant to growing networks
including important incentives for the concessionaire to increase service levels.
The contract for Melbourne's tram service and its related performance regime are
discussed in section 3.1. In Copenhagen the performance regime for bus service
focuses mainly on customer satisfaction. The outcomes of Copenhagen's
performance regime for bus service provision are analyzed in section 3.2.
London's contract for bus service has involved a substantial investment in better
bus service, in the form of incentive payments to contractors, and has realized a
significant return as discussed in section 3.3.
Section 3.4 summarizes the general findings and conclusions from these cases.
Next, the reasoning leading up to research on the design of a new performance
regime structure (section 3.2) is discussed, followed by a description of that
regime's desired characteristics (section 3.3).
3.1 MELBOURNE
The franchising of Melbourne's public transport system, in August 1999, was the
first effort towards privatization of a previously publicly owned and provided
urban service in Australia. By late 2002, Melbourne's public transit system was
on the brink of collapse, after one of the city's major contracted providers of train
and tram service, National Express, decided to terminate their contract early and
cease operations, leaving the state government responsible for continuing
operations. "This crisis was the result of unsustainable contracts signed by the
previous Liberal Government, which abdicated responsibility for public transport
and set unrealistic forecasts for patronage growth."(Office of the Premier, 2004)
Indeed, the scheduled decrease in public funding for train and tram services,
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over the life of the five franchises which began in 1999 and were meant to last 10
to 15 years, amounted to $1.8 billion (Public Transport Division, 2006).
The specific problems that led to the financial crisis were a government eager to
reduce public expenditure and an overly competitive, and mostly foreign, service
provider market; both of which forecasted future conditions based on
experiences from the United Kingdom. Among the specific factors that led to
financial unsustainability were:
- Unrealistically high forecasts for patronage growth from bidders, and
contractual patronage-based incentives and penalties based on the
elevated figures,
- Long-running disputes amongst concessionaires and with the agency
about the re-allocation of revenue between the five contractors,
- A fundamentally flawed maintenance monitoring regime, and
- Other inter-operator disputes.
Although the flaw in the privatization caused one operator to abandon their
contractual obligations and led to millions of dollars in losses for the remaining
contractors, many improvements to the network were also accomplished through
partnerships between the government and concessionaires between the start of
the first concessions in August 1999 and the financial crisis in 2002. Among the
achievements made were the commencement of a $2 billion capital investment
program, a 35% average reduction in delays and cancellations, a 10% increase
in services, and rising levels of customer satisfaction, despite well-documented
problems of the ticketing system (Public Transport Division, 2005).
Impressed by the improvements made possible by the public-private
partnerships, in May 2003 the Victorian government announced, that the
privatization scheme would be reformed in an attempt at stabilization. While the
positive characteristics of the old arrangement were to be maintained, the
authority also realized that large increases in subsidy would be necessary to
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ensure a well-functioning system. These subsidies include significant conditional
payments based on a concessionaire's willingness to increase service levels
over time from a base specified service plan.
3.1.1 Nature of the System
The public transport system in Melbourne includes train, tram, bus, taxi and ferry
services coordinated by the Public Transport Division of the Department of
Infrastructure. The Public Transport Division's current transport plan centers on
four main concerns: safety, rising congestion, the growth of the metropolitan
population, and promoting ongoing economic growth. In Melbourne, there is "a
strong culture of car use, and an urban form (and population density) not
generally conducive to high levels of public transport use in the outer suburbs"
(Public Transport Division, 2005)
The entire system consists of 610 rail route-kilometers and 9,142 bus route-
kilometers serving around 250 million passengers a year. The tram system,
specifically, covers urban and suburban areas on 31 routes with service levels of
nine million vehicle-kilometers operated per year. There are also some free tram
services that allow locals and tourists to travel in a loop around the city center.
There are 131 million boardings on the tram system annually. (Department of
Infrastructure, 2006)
To promote the growth of the metropolitan area, and discourage use of the
automobile, Melbourne's public transport system continues to expand. New
services, route extensions, and advances in technology are a few of the
improvements being made on the transit network in order to decrease
congestion, and better serve residents.
38
3.1.2 Organizational Structure
In February of 2004, the Public Transport Division entered into a renegotiated
five year agreement for the provision of tram services. The contract awarded all
tram service to one contractor as opposed to the two packages that were
tendered under the previous scheme. Instead of undertaking a new competitive
bid process, the government decided to negotiate with the one remaining tram
operators for the new franchise, and take advantage of the incumbent's
experience. The initial contract could be extended by up to 18 months at the
discretion of the authority.
The contract for Melbourne's tram service is a net cost contract with incentives,
worth an average of $112 million per year for five years. Although it is a net cost
contract, the concessionaire is protected by a revenue risk "safety-net" provided
by the state. Under this, the state pays the contractor 75% of any shortfall in
expected revenue. Since the risk-sharing mechanism is cumulative payments
made to the concessionaire in a particularly bad year may be repaid to the state
if the revenue collected over the contract term is sufficiently high. While the
"safety-net" feature is presumably a reaction to the overly-optimistic forecasts of
the previous tendering process, the cumulative nature of the "safety-net" might
prove disadvantageous. Because payments to the contractor are calculated on a
cumulative basis, there may be a disincentive for the contractor to increase
revenue in years following a "safety-net" payment.
The Public Transport Division is responsible for safety regulation, sustainable
funding, long term network and strategic planning, and development of the
ticketing system. The infrastructure and rolling stock are publicly owned and
leased to the concessionaire. The agency "requires the franchisee to provide at
least the same overall level of service (measured in tram kilometers) as that
provided at the beginning of each franchise -but with some flexibility to
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redistribute service levels on and between individual routes to match
demand"(Public Transport Division, 2005).
Infrastructure maintenance and operations are vertically integrated, so that one
concessionaire is responsible for both elements. A vertically integrated structure
can be beneficial in terms of accountability for poor performance. Under this type
of responsibility allocation, determinations on blame and corrective action may be
more straightforward than when separate concessions are awarded for
maintenance and service provision. While the authority places minimums on
staffing levels, the concessionaire is responsible for staff management and actual
levels of employment.
Each concessionaire is represented within Metlink, a private company
responsible for marketing and ticketing, which operates under contract to the
Public Transport Division. It is the responsibility of the operators through the
unified efforts of Metlink to provide:
- marketing
- day-to-day operation of the ticketing system
- service information
- collection of data on patronage
- allocation of revenue from ticket sales
3.1.3 Performance Regime
Although contractors retain the revenue risk, Melbourne's contract for tram
service includes a performance regime meant to encourage concessionaire
action that results in long-term improvements in the system. While there is an
emphasis on service reliability in the performance regime, provisions to improve
customer satisfaction and service levels are also included.
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Because of the success of the original privatization scheme at improving the level
and quality of service, the Operational Performance Regime (OPR) from the first
contract model was retained in the new version of the performance regime. The
OPR is a system for monitoring service reliability and motivating contractors to
improve performance through financial incentives. Actual service levels and the
resulting payments are assessed for each month with monthly incentive
payments (bonus or penalty) amounting to hundreds of thousands of dollars.
The movement of Melbourne's trams are tracked through an Automatic Vehicle
Monitoring system. Tram movements that signify early, late, short shunted (short
turned), or cancelled service are recorded at five points along the route, as
shown in Figure 3-1.
Origin Destination
1 2 3 4 5
Cancellations Cancellations Cancellations Cancellations Cancellations
Short Short Short Short Short
Shunting Shunting Shunting Shunting Shunting
- Early Running Early Running
- -
Delays (Late) Delays (Late)
Figure 3-1: Tram Service Monitoring (Public Transport Division, 2005)
"Monitoring points 2 and 4 are generally very close to the terminal monitoring
points. These are designed to ensure the tram franchisee is not penalised for a
service which is delayed for a significant amount of time while waiting for the
terminus to clear of the tram which operated the previous service." (Public
Transport Division, 2005) In this way, contractor's decisions to maintain
headways, rather than adhere strictly to the schedule, are not over-penalized.
The reliability indicator is determined by converting each observed instance of
deviant service into an amount of time. Late trams, for example, are simply
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represented by the number of minutes they are late. Cancellations, short shunts,
and early trams are assigned a predetermined minute value based on the
agency's perception of severity. Finally, each incident's time value is weighted
by the number of passengers affected, so concessionaires are encouraged to
disrupt the fewest passengers. Weighting delays by the number of passengers
affected may imply that reliable service during the off-peak is less important than
reliable service during the peak. Because off-peak service is normally run at
longer headways than peak service, policy makers should consider the possible
implications on customer satisfaction.
The sum of all "Passenger Weighted Minutes" then gives the performance
indicator for each month. If the indicator is worse than the target for that month,
the franchisee must pay a fine to the authority. If performance is better than the
target, the authority awards the franchisee a financial bonus.
The contractually stipulated performance targets are based on records of past
performance and fall into two categories, planned and unplanned performance,
where:
- Planned Performance: the extent to which the daily timetable conforms
with the long term, published master timetable. For example, engineering
work which will disrupt services is known in advance and passengers can
be given prior warning of the disruptions; and
- Unplanned Performance: the extent to which actual performance conforms
with the daily timetable. For example, a late driver will cause a delay which
is unforeseen and passengers cannot be warned beforehand. (Public
Transport Division, 2005)
Penalties incurred for unplanned deviations from the daily timetable are
assessed at twice the rate of those for planned deviations from the master
timetable (see Figure 3-2).
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Master
Timetable
Planned PWM
Less Target PWM
= Incentive/Penalty
PWM
x cents per PWM
Daily
Timetable
Actual Service
Times
Unplanned PWM
Less Tar et PWM
= Incentive Penalty
PWM
x cents per PWM
Figure 3-2: Incentive Payment Calculation (Public Transport Division, 2005)
Four categories of service disruption including force majeure events, defined
events such as suicide and fires, state planned projects, and special event
services are not penalized.
Performance targets are also adjusted manually during the contract term. "Every
time a timetable change occurs, targets are adjusted to reflect changes in vehicle
kilometres operated, scheduled journey times, changes to routes and any
alterations to systems which are nominated by the State"(Public Transport
Division, 2005). Additionally, targets are made more demanding each year and
passenger weightings are recalculated every three years. Figure 3-3 graphs the
decreasing targets for PWM's from 1998 to 2008/2009, reflecting an expectation
of continuous improvement in performance.
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Figure 3-3: OPR Targets by Year (Public Transport Division, 2005)
On top of the Operational Performance Regime, the state has implemented
incentives for increased frequency of service and better service quality.
The Service Growth Incentive (SGI) rewards increases in frequency based on an
estimated marginal cost for providing the extra service. The estimates of
marginal costs are based on the use of existing infrastructure and differ between
peak and off-peak periods. An annual cap of $4 million in bonuses is included as
part of the SGI program.
The Service Quality Incentive (SQl) is a discretionary tool for the Public
Transport Division. Through consultation with the contractor the authority is able
to award up to $3 million each year for performance above state specified
performance targets. The kind of performance to be monitored is up to the
discretion of the agency and performance measures can be changed or
eliminated from year to year. Therefore all or none of the $3 million may be
available to the contractor in any one year. The contractor cannot be penalized
for failing to meet an SQl target.
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In addition to the performance regime, the tram operator is required to
compensate regular passengers, with free tickets, for poor service. The following
events, shown in Table 3-1, trigger compensation to passengers who carry
periodic (eg. Monthly) tickets.
Compensation Trigger Events Compensatory Daily Tickets
If more than 5% of the distances 5% or more - 1 ticket
scheduled to be covered are not 8% or more - 2 tickets
covered
If more than 20% of services run more 20% or more - 1 ticket
than 1 minute early or 6 minutes late at 25% or more - 2 tickets
various monitoring points
If more than 5% of services are 5% or more - 1 ticket
affected by planned changes to service 10% or more - 2 tickets
running which, on occasion, will be
necessary
Table 3-1: Customer Service Charter Compensation (Yarra Trams, 2006)
3.1.4 Analysis and Conclusions
Because the contracts were first tendered only one year ago, there is no
conclusive evidence whether the new performance regime is more successful
than its predecessor. Table 3-2 charts the progression of service on the tram
network from October, 2004 to December, 2005.
Indicator Oct - Jan-Mar Jan-Mar Apr-Jun Jul-Sep Oct-Dec
Dec 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005
2004 (excl. Feb (incl. Feb
storm storm
impact) Impact)
% of services run on- 81.2 80.8 80.6 83.3 83.3 82.4time
% of scheduled service 0.5 0.8 1.0 0.4 0.2 0.4
cancelled
Incentive and penalty 27 Na 74 -186 464 
-431payments ($ ,000s)
Overall customer 72.4 Na 70.2 70.4 70.4 70.7satisfaction 32P Iraetasi by AssesmI P Infrastructure 2I06)
Table 3-2: Performance Statistics by Assessment Period (Department of Infrastructure, 2006)
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Although no significant improvement to service reliability has been observed
since the implementation of the OPR's, worsening traffic congestion may be
responsible. As congestion increases, tram operators will have less control over
service reliability, and it is possible that the OPR's have motivated
concessionaires to keep reliability from degrading as a result of congestion.
While Melbourne's incentive model includes features that would be appropriate
for most public transit systems, such as those encouraging customer satisfaction
and reliability, there are also characteristics that target aspects of performance
that are especially relevant to the expanding Melbourne network.
The service provider for Melbourne's tram network is given a large portion of the
responsibility for infrastructure improvement and service planning. This share in
the responsibility has allowed the authority to transfer the revenue risk to the
operator. This also means that the concessionaire will have significant influence
in shaping the future of Melbourne's transport system. Especially while the
system is growing, it is important to the Public Transport Division to motivate the
concessionaire to act in accordance with the agency's vision for the network.
The Service Growth Incentive, where the concessionaire can earn a bonus by
providing "extra"service, is one of the tools that the authority has utilized to
encourage growth of the system through private sector investment. As long as
estimates of the marginal cost of increasing frequency are accurate and the state
is willing to pay the incentive, the SGI can be effective at increasing levels of
service where, presumably, it will be most heavily utilized.
The Operational Performance Regime is built on increasing standards, another
provision which is especially relevant for improving and expanding systems.
While the quality and level of newer services cannot be expected to match
performance on more established networks, as time and money is invested,
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newer systems should advance with the ultimate objective of surpassing
benchmarks established by developed networks. If the expected conditions for
the entire length of the contract can be accurately predicted, incentives that
increase in accordance with those future conditions can be effective at increasing
performance. Setting targets that are unrealistically high or low, however, will not
be effective, as contractors have reduced motivation to put forth a maximum
effort to improve in either case. Since network growth is often associated with
disruption and uncertainty, it may be very difficult to predetermine targets based
on assumed future conditions.
In the Melbourne model, there are provisions within the contract (such as the
revenue "safety-net) that are meant to deal with uncertainty. Especially on a
growing network, policies that do not account for unplanned occurrences, can
lead to a disruptive tension between the authority and franchisee as well as
undesired consequences in terms of service. Another example is Melbourne's
policy to disable the OPR during certain unexpected or unusual events such as
terrorism or track work. However, a complete abandonment of the short-term
profit motive may send the wrong message that increased effort is not required
during these events. On the contrary, for the most favorable outcomes, an
exceptionally strong effort should be exerted to solve problems as quickly and
completely as possible.
3.2 COPENHAGEN
Copenhagen Transport was founded in 1974 to centralize the management of
the municipal bus companies in the five counties that make up the Greater
Copenhagen Region. In the 90's Copenhagen Transport, known as HT, became
recognized for employing a privatization model that was "the first in the world to
use customer surveys as the basis for an incentive programme for bus operators"
(Greater Copenhagen Authority). The move towards privatization in the 1990's
was a result of quality and patronage decreases on the bus system combined
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with increases in fares and union unrest. These problems were attributed to poor
management at the same time as attentive private operators claiming to be able
to operate the same services more efficiently. As a result, the Copenhagen
Transport Act was passed in 1990, restructuring the HT into an administrative
division and an operations division. The Copenhagen Transport Act also called
for privatization of bus operations based partly on the London bus restructuring
model, which occurred in the same period, except that a heavier emphasis was
placed on customer satisfaction under the Copenhagen model. Under the 1990
act, 45% of bus service would have to be tendered within five years to private
operators. In 1995, the Copenhagen Transport Act was revised so all bus
operations were to be tendered by 2002, requiring the authority's operations
division to bid on an equal footing with the private sector. The operations division
changed its name to BusDanmark A/S and won several tenders between 1995
and 1999. In 1999, BusDanmark A/S was bought by Arriva ltd., a British
operating company, effectively making all operators private.
The Greater Copenhagen Authority (HUR) took over as the public authority in
2000, hoping to bring "further advancement" and build upon the "history of
Copenhagen Transport ideas and results" (Greater Copenhagen Authority). The
HUR was created to centralize and integrate public transport, regional planning,
and land-use planning efforts. Although bus traffic is the organization's biggest
task, HUR is the leading authority on all regional planning including public
transport and traffic and has taken on the challenge of creating a single
intermodal transport system.
3.2.1 Nature of the System
The Greater Copenhagen Region is a metropolitan area of 1.8 million inhabitants
in almost 3,000 square kilometers. In order to serve these residents, 1,100
buses are operated daily on around 270 routes with a daily bus ridership of
800,000. Over 211 million passengers used the bus network in 2003, and six
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million passengers were recorded on the six railways comprising the regional rail
network (Greater Copenhagen Authority, 2005), both of which are controlled by
HUR. The majority of transit trips are completed on the urban rail network,
however, which the HUR does not oversee.
Copenhagen's bus system is fully integrated and connected to the train and
metro networks although there is a potential for travel time savings from better
integration of the bus and urban rail networks . The fare and ticketing systems
are also fully integrated and based on a zonal scheme. Tickets are checked by
bus operators at the time of boarding with a low fraud rate of approximately
0.3%. The HUR plans to replace the ticketing scheme with electronic smart
cards in the future for ease of use and efficiency.
3.2.2 Organizational Structure
The HUR uses gross cost contracts with quality incentives to regulate their
franchises, meaning the authority retains fare revenue collected by operators. As
of June 2003, seven principal operators were providing service in Copenhagen,
competing for packages with six year terms. Contracts are awarded based on a
"value analysis model" which takes into account important soft parameters.
Some of the features that warrant a higher bid price are modern bus fleets, a
high percentage of senior employees, and a track record of high quality
performance. Although companies are allowed to submit bids as joint ventures,
packages are intentionally kept small to allow small operator access to the
market.
Because the government is concerned with providing a seamless network,
planning responsibilities were retained by the authority during the 90's transition
to privatization. These responsibilities include scheduling, establishing routes
and fares, conducting passenger surveys and handling complaints, bus design,
and setting service standards. The government authority owns the infrastructure
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and is responsible for investments in information technology, marketing, bus-
stops and terminals.
Along with service provision, operators are responsible for providing buses and
training employees. Concessionaires also participate in route planning activities.
3.2.3 The Performance Regime
The Copenhagen Model was the first to use customer satisfaction surveys as the
major element of performance measurement. As is more typical, the
performance regime also employs measures of service reliability to determine the
amount of incentive payment due to concessionaires. The HUR specifies
minimum targets for all measures and concessionaires can agree to performance
targets above the minimum during the bid process.
HUR monitors nine satisfaction indicators to assess operator performance, and
their combined Quality Index (QI). Performance scores for each indicator are
weighted by importance to customers and then summed to calculate the Quality
Index. Table 3-3 displays all nine performance measures, and their respective
importance factors. Any individual measure's target can be reset in case of
"external factors out of the operator's ability to change" (Greater Copenhagen
Authority). By multiplying the agreed upon target by the importance factor, the
measure's expected contribution to the Quality Index is determined. Table 3-3
shows the contributions for each measure to the Total Quality Index which is
equal to 810 points in this example.
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Measure Target Importance Contribution to QI
Outdoor cleaning and maintenance 81 0.65 52.65
Interior cleaning 81 1.08 87.48
Interior maintenance 81 1.15 93.15
Temperature 81 1.17 94.77
Ventilation 81 1.13 91.53
Confinement of noise 81 0.96 77.76
Keeping to the timetable 81 1.40 113.40
Driver's standard of driving 81 1.37 110.97
Driver's service and appearance 81 1.09 88.29
Total Quality Index 1 810
Table 3-3: Quality Index Calculation (GCA l 8thInvitation to Tender)
"HUR carries out a customer survey as and when needed (though not more than
once every three years) in order to determine the customers' opinion of the
relative importance of the assessment points" (GCA 18 th Invitation to Tender).
HUR also collects survey information on customer satisfaction to assess each
contractor's performance every three months. For each of the performance
indicators, customers are asked to rate their satisfaction using a five point scale
ranging from very satisfied to very dissatisfied. Each of the five satisfaction
ratings is assigned a score by HUR, relative to minimum performance targets of
81 points (see Table 3-4). Notice the zero score assigned to the "very
dissatisfied" response, reflective of HUR's belief that the negative implications of
"very dissatisfied" customers outweigh the positive associations of "very satisfied
customers".
Customer Satisfaction Weighting in the Contractor Model
Very satisfied 100.00
Satisfied 83.33
Yes and no 66.67
Dissatisfied 50.00
Very dissatisfied 0.00
Table 3-4: Satisfaction Survey Response Weightings (GCA 18 th Invitation to Tender)
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The average satisfaction score for a given measure is the contractor's actual
level of performance for that measure. The sum of all performance scores
weighted by their importance, is equal to the actual QI measured.
If the actual QI for a period is less than the target QI for that period, a penalty is
assessed and no bonus is awarded. In that case, the individual measures of
performance are irrelevant to the calculation of penalties. The penalty for a
failure to meet the QI is equal to a percentage of the contract sum, depending on
the target QI and the amount of shortfall. For shortfalls from the target QI within
the interval of:
850.1 - 1000 each point equals a 0.0067% penalty
800 - 850 each point equals a 0.04% penalty
750 - 799.9 each point equals a 0.08% penalty
for a maximum penalty of seven percent of the contract sum. In other words,
each point of shortfall from the QI is assessed at a lower rate as the target
increases in difficulty. Below is an example of the calculation of the penalty
payment associated with a failure to meet the QI.
Example (GCA 1 8 th Invitation to Tender)
The contract amount is DKK 24 million for a given year. The target QI is 860, and the
measured QI is 790. The calculation of the penalty rate is:
(860.0 - 850.1) x 0.0067 + (850.0 - 800.0) x 0.04 + (799.9 - 790.0) x 0.08 = 2.86
The penalty assessed will then be: DKK 686,400 = DKK 24,000,000 x 2.86%
If the measured overall QI meets or surpasses the target QI, then individual
performance measures are assessed for bonuses and penalties. In this case,
bonuses are awarded to contractors for performance above an individual
satisfaction indicator's target. The bonus calculation depends on the number of
points above the target, the indicator's importance, the contract sum and a
variable rate. The variable rate is based on the target QI and a maximum bonus
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of three percent of the contract sum where the value of a single satisfaction point
above or below an individual performance target is defined for Quality Indices
falling in the interval of:
800-850 as equal to 0.04% of the contract sum
850-1000 as equal to 0.0067% of the contract sum
Therefore, an increase in the target Quality Index results in a decrease in the
percentage of the contract price available as incentive to the concessionaire. An
example showing the bonus calculation is presented in below.
Example (GCA 1 8 th Invitation to Tender)
The contract sum is DKK 24 million for a given year. The target QI equals 810, and the
actual QI is 818. The performance measure "interior maintenance" has an importance of
1.15 and has a score of 83.0 satisfaction points, where the target was 81.3. The
calculation of the bonus for the performance measure will be as follows:
DKK 24,000,000 x 1.15 x (83.0 - 81.3) x 0.04% = DKK 18,768
For performance below an individual performance measure's target (when the
target QI is reached) penalties are assessed in the same manner as the bonus
payments. The minimum target is two points lower than the agreed target',
creating a neutral zone between the minimum target and agreed target where no
payments are elicited. Contractors must also submit an action plan, if
performance is below par, describing how quality will be improved.
Once the initial level of bonus and penalty payments are calculated, payments
rewarded to the contractor may be further reduced, depending on service
reliability as indicated by the service level, where the service level is equal to the
percent of scheduled bus hours that are actually run. As the service level
decreases, the percentage of bonuses awarded is also decreased as shown in
Table 3-5.
1Because the importance factors are derived through statistical procedures, a two point
correction is allowed for sampling error.
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Service level Bonus value
Agreed target - 100.00 100%
99.86 - agreed target 60%
99.81 - 9985 30%
99.76 - 99.80 10%
99.75 and below No payment
Table 3-5: Percent of Bonus Awarded by Service Level (GCA 1 8 th Invitation to Tender)
HUR also reserves the right to impose a penalty of 30-400 euros per occurrence
for instances such as:
- early departure from terminus
- missing tickets
- failure to replace defective ticketing equipment
- operation of another bus type than the agreed
- delayed departure from terminus of more than two minutes
- incorrect destination signs
- missing information folders
- failure to meet the cleanliness standards
Furthermore, penalties are imposed (at a rising rate) if any agreed journeys are
cancelled. As is the case for legal contracts, HUR is able to terminate the
arrangement if a material breach in contract occurs. "If the operator continues to
neglect his contractual duties despite written notification, or if the operator
provides less than 75% of scheduled services, HUR is entitled to cancel the
contract." (Greater Copenhagen Authority)
3.2.4 Analysis and Conclusions
HUR claims that their contracting model, and the resulting competition have been
able to effectively reduce costs, improve quality, and increase patronage. "From
the first tendering round in 1990 to the seventh round in 1997, the costs per bus
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hour had fallen by 24%. At the same time, patronage increased by 8% from
1993-1997" (Greater Copenhagen Authority). Figure 3-4 shows the change in
unit costs since the start of their restructuring. Interestingly, Denmark's second
largest city, Aarhus, whose bus services are still publicly operated, observed bus
costs per hour that were more than 50% greater than the cost to HUR, in 2002.
This implies that significant cost reductions have been made possible by
restructuring.
600 537
500 ---- 509 4 -- ~------------ 442-_44 -- 4-79---446---441--
400-- 398 387 388--- -- -
200- -- --- -- --- -- -- -- -- --- -- --- --
100 - --- -- --- -- -- --- -- --- -- --- -- -
0
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.
tender tender tender tender tender tender tender tender tender tender tender tender tender
1990 1990 1992 1994 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2003
Figure 3.4: Bus Costs per Hour, 2002-prices, DKK (Greater Copenhagen Authority)
With such a strong focus on customer satisfaction, it may not be surprising that
the estimated quality of service has been steadily increasing since the
introduction of the performance regime. According to HUR, in 2001, 94% of
customers were satisfied with bus service, and only 1.4% dissatisfied (Greater
Copenhagen Authority).
While the Copenhagen model is valued highly at HUR, most agencies would be
hesitant to rely so heavily on customer perceptions to evaluate operator
performance. There is evidence to believe that customer satisfaction is a product
of many factors, including aspects which may not be controllable by the transit
operator. It is therefore possible, under this performance regime, to penalize
contractors for decreases in customer satisfaction that are the result of factors
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entirely out of the concessionaire's control. While a provision is included in the
performance regime to adjust targets for externalities, the magnitude of influence
of exogenous factors on bus operations will not be easily discernable. Should
target adjustment be necessary, coming to a consensus on the new target level
may prove difficult.
On the other hand, payments to the contractor, through the Copenhagen model,
are based on satisfaction indicators that are more directly linked to operator
action than is overall satisfaction. The nine measures of satisfaction relate
mostly to conditions onboard vehicles, which are owned and directly controlled
by the private operator in the Copehagen model. Also, linking bonuses to on-
time performance is likely to encourage contractors to provide reliable service,
regardless of customer perceptions.
Additionally, moving in the direction of the theoretical incentive proposed contract
by Laffont and Tirole, this scheme expects the contractor to reveal their own
efficiency level during the bidding phase by agreeing to an expected Quality
Index. Along with the political advantages to this setup, such as the fostering of
a more unified working environment, this process is likely to improve the validity
of performance targets and may garner increased operator attention to the
performance regime.
Unlike Laffont and Tirole's model, however, the Copenhagen model's incentives
become less powerful as contractors choose higher levels of efficiency. The
provision that higher Quality Indices result in bonuses at lower rates may be a
tool used by the agency to encourage concessionaires to be honest when
selecting their Quality Index during the bidding process.
In more recent years, the competition for bus tenders has started to decrease
and hourly bus costs have risen in the latest rounds of tendering. Although the
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original cost reductions may have been artificially low due to over eager bidding
from public operators, reduced competition is potentially a brewing problem.
One method for increasing competition and reducing bus costs is to include a
patronage incentive within the performance regime. In the absence of a
patronage incentive, under a gross cost regime, the private sector has no short-
term profit motive for collecting fares or increasing ridership. Perhaps because
increasing ridership isn't a major concern in "a public transportation - conscious
city like Copenhagen" (Henrik Visborg Thune, 2006) no incentive has been
included to date. There are, however, plans at HUR to begin experimenting with
patronage incentives.
3.3 LONDON
Before competitive tendering of bus services in London the government agency,
London Transport (LT), was responsible for both planning and operations for the
city's bus network. In 1985, the London Regional Transport Act was passed,
requiring LT to establish subsidiary companies to manage the bus and
underground networks, and progressively introduce competitive tendering. At the
same time, full deregulation of bus services was occurring in the rest of the
United Kingdom, meaning "any licensed operator could apply to run a new route
even if another company already ran a service along the same roads" (Transport
for London, 2006). Greater London was temporarily exempted from the fully
deregulated scheme due to the complexity of the London network, and the higher
public dependence on the capital's bus system. The subsidiary London Buses
Limited (LBL) was created to run the bus services while route planning and fare
setting were retained by LT.
London Transport began to competitively tender routes, causing LBL to compete
against private sector companies to run services under LT's oversight. Moving
towards possible full deregulation LBL created 13 locally based subsidiary
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companies which competed independently against the private sector and against
each other. Many of the initial tenders resulted in routes being awarded to
private operators. By the mid 1990's almost all of London's bus routes were
operated under a public private concession contract and subsidies had been
totally eliminated by the late 90's.
In 2000, with the election of Ken Livingstone as the first popularly elected Mayor
of London, LT was replaced by the new organization Transport for London (TfL).
Transport for London was formed to carry out the mayor's Transport Strategy
and manage all forms of transport within the capital. Today, London Buses is an
integral part of TfL with all bus services operated by private companies under the
oversight of London Buses and TfL.
3.3.1 Nature of the System
The public transport system in Greater London is comprised of bus, underground
train, and suburban rail services along with river boats, taxis and trams.
Everyday, over 10 million journeys are taken on some form of public transport in
London. The public transport system is fully integrated, and TfL is in the process
of converting all fare payment to Smartcard technology.
The bus network alone provides 450 million bus kilometers annually on 700
routes, making it one of the largest and most comprehensive bus systems in the
world. Every weekday over 6,800 scheduled buses carry around six million
passengers. In the 2004/05 fiscal year, 1.8 billion journeys were taken on the bus
network, and bus ridership continues to grow. At Transport for London the bus
network is believed to be the "best-option" for increasing short-term capacity on
the network. In fact, a goal of Mayor Livingstone and London Buses is to
increase bus passenger journeys by 40% between 2001 and 2011 (Transport for
London, 2006).
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3.3.2 Organizational Structure
Initially, bus concessions were let under gross cost contracts, with the operators
taking no revenue risk. In the mid 90's the contracts were changed to a net-cost
structure, allowing private operators to retain the cash revenue paid to the driver
as well a portion of the travelcard revenue collected by London Transport.
While the intent of net-cost contracts was to improve the quality of service, this
ultimately was not the case. Problems arose as contractors added premiums to
their bid prices to cover the risk of "losing revenue due to circumstances outside
their control, such as long-term roadwork" (Transport Committee, 2006). In
addition, the amount of revenue collected by operators was affected by changes
to the bus network made by London Transport to meet changes in passenger
demand. As a consequence, a great deal of agency attention was needed to
continuously adjust contracts.
In the late 90's, London Transport returned to pure gross cost contracts, as a
temporary solution until incentive contracts could be implemented. The gross
cost contracts were meant to adapt to the "turn-up-and-go" nature of demand on
bus networks. Unfortunately, contractors under this scheme still found
themselves losing money as staff and fuel prices increased faster than the
general inflation allowance included in the contract. This led to reduced driver
salaries, and a higher turnover of staff. As a result, newly tendered contracts had
significantly increased costs even as excess wait times and performance
worsened. "Operators found themselves with fewer levers with which to control
their performance and declining returns or even losses and London Transport
found itself in the unenviable position of having to run a service itself when an
operator, Harris Bus, went into administration and no other credible operator was
prepared to take the risk and operate the route itself." (Transport Committee,
2006).
59
Gross cost contracts with incentives linked to service reliability called Quality
Incentive Contracts (QIC's) were introduced on the London bus network in 2001.
Initially contractors paid more in penalties than they received in bonuses,
possibly because of the private sectors' eagerness to win the QIC's for bus
services leading to over optimistic bids.
Under the current contracts, London Buses is responsible for planning routes and
services and monitoring service quality. LBL is also responsible for bus stops,
stations, and other supporting services. The contracts tendered by London
Buses are estimated to cost a total of E1400 million annually, including a subsidy
of E550 million. There are seven major operators across the bus network (the
cumulative market share of other operators is 4.4%), with an average of three
concessionaires bidding on each retendered package (Transport Committee).
London Buses actively develops the market for bus services by approaching
potential concessionaires. For example, LBL has even gone as far as to lease
the use of one of their garages to the concessionaire National Express, after
finding the lack of depot premises was a significant barrier to entry.
Under the London bus model, operators provide the agency-specified levels of
service, and are responsible for costs relating to drivers, vehicles, fuel, garage
and office premises, engineering support, insurance and administration.
3. 3.3 Performance Regime
The performance regime of the QIC's is based on financial incentives for
reliability and provides the possibility for concessionaires to extend contracts
from five to seven years. Contract extension is based on meeting standards in
the areas of "vehicle cleanliness, quality of bus blinds, ride quality, driver
presentation, and the presence of graffiti and etching" (Transport Committee,
2006) which are evaluated through mystery shopper surveys.
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Performance payments are awarded annually based on comparison against the
Minimum Performance Standards of Quality Service Indicators (QSI's). The
standards specify the expected level of reliability for bus service. Since
customers are likely to consult a timetable for low frequency routes, routes with
headways of 15 minutes or more are assessed based on "on-time" performance.
For these routes a bus is on-time if it arrives between two minutes before and
five minutes after the scheduled time.
For high frequencies routes, with headways of less than 12 minutes, excess wait
time is evaluated. This is based on the theory that passengers on these routes
will show up at a bus stop, without consulting a timetable, with the expectation
that a bus will be arriving shortly. Excess wait time is determined by calculating
the difference between actual and scheduled wait times.
Minimum Performance Standards are calculated for individual routes using a
formula that takes into account the operating conditions, including congestion,
the length of the route, and the reliability history.
QSI's are calculated every four weeks for each route through the use of on-street
observers. These observers are positioned at key-points and are equipped with
hand-held computers. The data is then published on the internet so it is
accessible to both the public and contractors. Performance Payments are
calculated each year with a maximum bonus of 15% of the contract sum, and a
maximum penalty of 10%.
The bonus payment rate was determined by TfL through a cost benefit analysis,
which takes into account both increases in revenue and passenger benefit.
For high frequency routes, each 0.10 minute of excess wait time improvement
over the performance target is rewarded by 1.5% of the contract sum. For
performance worse than the target the operator is required to pay 1 % of the
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contract for each 0.10 minute of excess wait time. For low frequency routes,
1.5% of the contract sum is awarded as a bonus for each 2% of on-time
performance above the performance target. For each 2% of on-time
performance below the target, a 1 % penalty is due.
Driver Quality Monitoring, inspections of vehicle quality, number of kilometers not
operated, wheelchair ramp availability, and customer satisfaction surveys are
also monitored but not directly tied to incentive payments.
3.3.4 Analysis and Conclusions
Since the implementation of the QICs in 2000, many positive trends have been
evidenced within the London bus network. Excess wait time, the operating
measure on which contract incentives and penalties are primarily based, has
decreased by over two minutes from 2000 to 2004 (see Figure 3-5).
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Figure 3-5: Excess Wait Times (Transport Committee, 2006)
While it may be difficult to establish what portion of this decrease in excess wait
time can be attributed to operators' actions, rather than other factors such as
congestion charging, improvement observed in other aspects of service support
the success of the Quality Incentive Contracts. Scheduled kilometers lost to staff
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shortages, for example, have dropped from 1.3% in April-June of 2001 to 0.1% in
April-June 2005 (Transport Committee, 2006).
Figure 3-6 illustrates a 26% increase in bus kilometers operated alongside a 32%
increase in the number of bus passenger journeys since 1990/91.
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Figure 3-6: Millions of Passenger Journeys by Year (Transport Committee, 2006)
The improved performance by bus operators is also reflected in increased bonus
payments to London Bus operators, increasing from a net penalty of -2.0% in
2000/01 to a net bonus of 5.1% in 2004/05, as illustrated in Table 3-6.
Year 2001/2 2002/3 2003/4 2004/5 Forecast
2005/6
Total number of 1 111 210 318 406
applicable contracts
Performance payments 
-2.0% 2.1% 3.9% 5.1% 5.6%(% of gross costs)
Table 3-6: Performance Payments by Year (Transport Committee, 2006)
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The average number of bids per route also began to rise after 2002, perhaps in
response to increases in the bonuses being awarded as shown in Figure 3-7.
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Figure 3-7: Average Number of Tenders per Route by Year of Award (Transport Committee, 2006)
As the amount of bonus, the price of fuel, and workers wages have all increased,
Figure 3-8 shows that the cost per kilometer of bus contracts has remained
relatively steady.
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Figure 3-8: Cost per Vehicle Mile of Bus Operations by Year (Transport Committee, 2006)
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The slow increase in operational costs may indicate an efficient market,
attributable to greater competition for each contract. Additionally, the aggregate
pre-tax profits in London were 8% in 2003/2004 compared with 12.3% for
operators in the deregulated UK environment outside London (Transport
Committee, 2006).
Quality Incentive Contracts for bus service and the E1400 million in
remuneration, therefore, have provided considerable value. Although subsidies
increased from zero in 1999 to E550 million in 2004/05 the associated benefits
including greater competition, higher levels of service, and increased patronage
are considered by Transport for London to be well worth the cost.
As bonuses continue to increase, and bus operating costs remain stable, it is
difficult to prove the cost efficiency of the reliability incentives included in the
QIC's. Targets which adjust automatically, in a predetermined manner, could
provide a systematic and non-controversial method for adapting expected
performance levels to actual conditions in order to justify higher payments for
improved quality.
3.4 GENERAL FINDINGS
While each of the three cities examined in this chapter approach concession
contracting differently, all can be considered successful models for concession
contracting for transit services. Reductions in cost and improvements to service
quality have been observed in all three cases, when comparing service before
and after restructuring.
It is interesting to compare the net cost contract approach employed in
Melbourne to the two gross cost contracts (with incentives) used in London and
Copenhagen. Although the built-in revenue safety-net in Melbourne makes its
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contract appear more like a gross cost approach in terms of overall
concessionaire risk, the additional responsibility shouldered by Melbourne tram
operators, including infrastructure maintenance and some freedom to redistribute
service levels, probably affords these operators greater control over the revenue
collected, therefore, supporting the use of a net-cost approach. Since planning
and service specification are handled by the oversight agency in the Copenhagen
and London models, their concessionaires have a reduced capacity for
increasing revenue compared to Melbourne's tram operators, and these models
are better suited for gross cost contracts.
It should also be noted that the London bus contracts are simpler in design, with
the bulk of significant bonus and penalty payments contingent on only one
performance measure, while the two more complex performance regimes seem
able to motivate improvement on a variety of performance characteristics without
discouraging the concessionaire or affecting the overall objectives of service
quality and patronage.
However, London's model has led to increased competition and decreased bid
prices, while bus costs have recently risen in Copenhagen. This may suggest
that simpler forms of performance monitoring are perceived as less risky to
concessionaires, or may be a result of a larger financial incentive to the
concessionaire in the London model (in terms of percent of contract price). In
either case, a relationship between the perceived incentive strength and
competition for contracts is implied.
The performance regimes under all three models employ expected levels of
performance and established benchmarks to assess the quality of service
provision. Recognizing that events outside the service provider's control may
have noticeable impacts on quality of service and performance levels, each
performance regime studied also includes a scheme to manually adjust targets in
case of such events.
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Because there is substantial cost associated with revision of contract terms along
with the potential for negative public attention and disagreement between the
authority and concessionaire (discussed further in section 3.8), an adaptive
regime structure may be more efficient at encouraging desirable contractor
behavior given actual circumstances. Especially in situations where the
probability of deviation from expected service conditions is high, a self-adjusting
performance regime structure can help to encourage good performance
regardless of the difference between actual and expected conditions. If this
structure can also be well-understood and accepted by both the authority and
concessionaires, adverse reactions associated with modification of contract
terms can be mitigated.
Next, two of the performance regime structures considered for monitoring
concessionaires' performance in the North London Railway case, where future
conditions are relatively uncertain, are examined.
3.5 POTENTIAL PERFORMANCE REGIME STRUCTURES FOR THE NLR
Historically, Silverlink Metro, under the management of the SRA, has been
governed by the SRA-DfT Rail Franchise Agreement. This agreement, most
recently revised in 2005, is designed to encourage consistent performance
through the inclusion of benchmarks relating to service quality and provisions
aimed at motivating operators to work cooperatively with Network Rail to avoid
delays. The included performance regime, however, was not designed to deal
with substantial uncertainty and little, if any control by the concessionaire over
the most important elements of the service specification.
The performance regime, under the Rail Franchise Agreement, provides for the
reward of a contract extension of up to three years, based on the
concessionaire's performance relative to benchmarks for minutes of delay,
cancellation of service, and capacity reduction. Although these aspects of
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service will be important determinants of customer satisfaction and increased
patronage in the North London Railway case, indicating the quality of
performance through the use of benchmarks established on relatively stable rail
lines is likely to result in unrealistic performance targets if employed for rapidly
changing services such as NLR. Furthermore, contract extension for service on
the NLR during this transitional phase is probably not a motivating feature as
many of the bugs will be worked out during the first contract cycle, and
renegotiation or revision of the contract terms will almost certainly be necessary.
Poor performance, as well as good, is assessed in the Rail Franchise Agreement
in terms of service reliability and capacity reduction. Penalties include
development and delivery of a remedial plan for sub-par performance and
ultimately default for levels of service that represent a breach of contract.
Requiring the contractor to devise a plan for improving on aspects of poor
performance and to provide proof of implementation of that plan, can be effective
in encouraging the agency and concessionaire to collaborate and resolve areas
of concern. Because a concerted effort is critically important for overcoming
problems encountered during stages of investment, imposing a financial penalty
if the agreed upon plan of action is not fulfilled by the contractor, may be more
effective at inducing change.
The revised SRA/DfT contract does include provisions for revenue sharing when
profits are above predetermined targets, as well as financial penalties for
revenues below expected levels. This type of incentive to increase revenue, by
either reducing ticketless travel or increasing patronage can have a positive
outcome, if the targets are sufficient to motivate the necessary contractor action.
Because of the inherent uncertainty, in this case, it is unclear whether historical
methods for determining revenue targets are applicable.
As an alternative to the SRA/DfT model, TfL might also consider employing a
modified London bus incentive structure, described earlier in this chapter, as the
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basis for the performance regime in the North London Railway concession
contract. Because the bus contracts, and their supporting performance regimes,
have been successful at obtaining low-price bids and high-quality service an
adaptation of that structure to the new rail service might encourage quality
performance during the turbulent investment period and become a viable model
for future regional rail services.
For the past decade, London's bus industry has been highly competitive, with an
adequate supply of qualified bidders, and performance parameters such as travel
time, delays, cost, Mystery Shopper Scores', and ridership that are used in the
formulation of incentives are easily estimated from current performance.
The same cannot be said for the recent history with train operating companies
and their performance on regional rail services. Especially as estimates of travel
time, cost, customer satisfaction and ridership would be founded on significantly
less data in the rail case than in the bus case, motivating contractors through
uncertain targets aimed at decreasing projected wait times per passenger may
be flawed. In addition, a smaller pool of qualified bidders in the rail case means
that incentives will likely need to be more substantial than in the bus case to
produce cost-effective bids as it is likely that the overall concessionaire risk in the
regional rail case will also be perceived to be higher.
Because of uncertain future conditions, and the importance of superior
performance, the performance regime included in the contract for North London
Railway service deserves special attention. Where most performance regimes
are based on a collection of data and representations of good, average, and poor
quality service provision, in the North London Railway case, the information
needed to characterize good or bad service is not available at the contract
specification stage.
Mystery Shopper Surveys are a technique used regularly in monitoring bus and underground train
concessionaires' performance through the use of undercover auditors.
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There is a clear need for new thinking, in terms of the performance regime
specification, in the North London Railway case. Specifically, the new regime
structure should be able to deal with uncertainty regarding the timing and delivery
of changes to service, and should provide appropriate incentives to contractors
regardless of actual circumstances.
3.6 DESIRED CHARACTERISTICS OF PERFORMANCE REGIME
It is important to develop a general understanding of how a performance regime
should function, before attempting to develop the specification. A successful
performance regime in the North London Railway case should have the following
characteristics:
- Motivates good performance regardless of deviation from expected
circumstances,
- Maximizes concessionaire performance and accommodation during
several years of infrastructure and rail car upgrades,
- Avoids the need to renegotiate annual targets and payment amounts,
- Aligns interests of TfL and the concessionaire,
- Encourages qualified operators to compete for the tender, and
- Minimizes cost to the public authority.
First and foremost, the performance regime for North London Railway service
should motivate good performance from contractors regardless of actual service
conditions. Surprises or unexpected conditions, during the contract term, should
not undermine the effectiveness of the incentives included in the performance
regime and the improvements scheduled on the line during the early years of the
service should be implemented with minimum disruption to daily service.
Although it is impossible to foresee every event that may negatively impact the
effectiveness of the performance regime, it is important to design a structure that
adapts to a variety of possible conditions and remains relevant to contractors, in
order to ensure a high quality product.
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To deal with unanticipated future events, many contracts allow for renegotiation
of the performance regime's targets if factors beyond the operator's control
interfere with the contractor's ability to perform at contractually specified levels.
Renegotiation of contract terms, however, is usually a difficult and politically
charged process. For renegotiation to result in a good deal for the public, the
agency should be on an equal footing with the contractor, and should possess at
least the same information as the contractor regarding the magnitude and effects
of unexpected conditions. Even successful renegotiations involve an increased
cost to both the agency and the contractor as time and effort are expended to
achieve an acceptable balance. In the end, negotiation procedures are not
always transparent, and may be portrayed in a negative light by the media if
concessionaires are allowed lower performance standards, even if a reduction is
clearly warranted. To avoid unnecessary expenditures and the possibility of
negative effects on the agency's reputation, unforeseen changes to the expected
level of contractor performance should be managed, if possible, within the
structure of the initial contract while minimizing the need for renegotiation. This
implies that the regime's performance targets should be defined adaptively in the
contract, in order to deal with unexpected circumstances in an agreed upon
manner.
By circumventing renegotiation of the contract terms, both the agency and
concessionaire will be able to focus on providing high quality service and the risk
of direct conflict between the authority and contractor can be reduced. Since the
quality of service can be improved if all involved parties are cooperating, an
alignment of the contractor's and agency's interests is beneficial and should be
sought in all aspects of the performance specification.
Another approach to regime design that can aid in the maintenance of an
effective working relationship between the agency and concessionaire is to
penalize the contractor only when the operator's actions contribute to poor quality
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service. Exacting hefty fines from the concessionaire can have negative impacts
on the well-being of the contractor, and may result in a reduction of service
quality. Threatening the financial sustainability of the operator, through
excessive penalties, may even lead to a termination of contract and probable
disruptions to service further reducing quality. Since TfL will control many of the
key aspects that can lead to the success of the North London Railway service,
the regime should be carefully designed to avoid penalizing the contractor for
performance issues beyond the concessionaire's control, or for poorly selected
performance targets. Maintaining a fair balance of penalty and bonus payments
to the concessionaire can also provide more attractive working conditions so
qualified bidders may be motivated to participate in the tendering process,
potentially increasing the competition for the contract.
Although it is difficult to predict, well in advance, the level and quality of service
that is achievable, motivating the desired contractor performance can be handled
by offering incentives designed to exceed the marginal cost associated with
incremental improvements to the selected characteristics of service. While an
incentive designed for the highest cost scenario could be effective in any
situation, that same incentive would be inefficient in all other scenarios, by
definition. Since the resources available to an agency are limited, and because
excessive rents paid to private contractors are likely to receive negative public
and media attention, the North London Railway's performance incentives need to
be efficient. Especially since high levels of agency investment are likely to cause
substantial improvements in the quality of service, TfL would be ill-advised to
award contractors for improvements that are generated by the public agency's
actions. For some measures of performance, however, management attention
from the concessionaire, not simply expenditure, is required to improve service.
The regime structure should, therefore, provide motivation to the concessionaire
through incentives that garner management attention, but still represent value for
the money.
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Therefore, the performance regime to be implemented on the North London
Railway should be designed so that the regime motivates above-average
performance from the contractor even in the case of unexpected events, while
allowing a cooperative relationship between the authority and operator, and
providing for the long-term well-being of both entities, all at a minimal cost to the
public. Such a performance regime structure, inspired by the North London
Railway but generally applicable for services with similar circumstances, is
proposed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4: The Proposed Performance Regime
With enough information, a performance regime can be an efficient and effective
tool for aligning the interests of the government agency and the contractor.
Within a cooperative relationship, both parties can be more successful at
realizing their goals, which in turn, provides greater benefits for the public.
However, most performance regimes are specified based on accurate
information available during the contract definition period. Without it, contract
specifications may produce unintended results, such as rewards for poor
contractor behavior or creation of a rift between the agency and the provider.
Such unintended consequences can lead to negative attention for the
government agency and, more importantly, poor transportation service.
A performance regime can be particularly useful when major changes to service
are anticipated. The regime can encourage the agency and contractor to work
together, combining forces to deal with difficult transition stages, and obtain the
most benefit from investments. However, uncertainty about the service
outcomes makes gathering the desired information extremely difficult. The
recognition of this paradox, through consideration of the North London Railway,
led to research to develop a new form of performance regime.
The product of that research is a performance regime designed for the NLR to
motivate above-average performance from the contractor even in the case of
unexpected events, while encouraging a cooperative relationship between the
authority and operator, and providing for the long-term well-being of both entities,
all at a minimal cost to the public. Because these characteristics are desirable
for other transit concession contracts, where service levels are agency-specified
and operational cost risk is retained by the concessionaire, the regime structure
is more generally applicable.
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The general regime structure as presented in this chapter consists of two
components, first, the component dealing with specific characteristics of
performance which the concessionaire has some level of control over is
presented in section 4.1. The second component is a revenue/ridership incentive
that allows gain-sharing of revenue above that expected by the public agency
(section 4.2). Together these components can encourage contractors to improve
upon the major aspects of service under their control as well as pay close
attention to strategies which can alter the quality and profitability of service.
4.1 SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE MEASURES
This component of the performance regime, relating to specific performance
measures, provides a system for determining financial bonuses and penalties to
concessionaires when the determination of target levels, during contract design,
is difficult due to uncertainty about future service conditions.
The most important feature of the proposed structure is an adaptive mechanism
that annually resets incentive and penalty target threshold levels. Automatic
resetting allows targets to be based on actual contractor performance, including
data collected from annually. This different approach to setting performance
targets, which are typically static and predetermined, is intended to manage pre-
contract uncertainty regarding what levels of contractor performance are
realistically achievable.
The proposed performance regime should reward good performance, penalize
poor performance, and be neutral for expected performance. This implies an
incentive level which initiates the bonus zone, a penalty level below which
performance is penalized, and a neutral zone representing the range of expected
performance. Of course, uncertainties, such as the timing of anticipated changes
to service levels, make selection of the bonus, neutral, and penalty ranges
difficult. Instead, setting the initial expected thresholds based on the best
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information available and allowing these thresholds to adapt over time is a key
property of the design. This section describes the mechanics of target resetting
as well as the calculation of bonus and penalty payments for specific aspects of
performance.
4.1.1 Default, Initial, and Maximum Thresholds
Each performance measure included in this component of the performance
regime is associated with a default, expected, and maximum level, determined by
the public agency, based on experience and agency expectations.
The default level is the point below which concessionaire performance is
unacceptable. Default levels represent a breach of contract, and can lead to
termination of the contract or other significant corrective actions. The maximum
level represents the highest achievable performance and the expected level
represents average operator performance. In the first year of the concession,
performance below the expected level elicits penalties, while performance above
this level produces a bonus, as illustrated in Figure 4-1. The default and
maximum level will not change in subsequent years from the level determined for
the first year.
Default Level Expected Level Maximum Level
Penalty Zone ' ' Bonus Zone
Figure 4-1: Default, Expected, and Maximum Levels
The expected level could be tied to the performance level currently achieved on
the service, but should really be an estimate of expected performance for a
measure for the service levels and conditions in place for the initial year of the
contract.
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Maximum annual bonuses and penalties will also be selected (section 4.1.5),
where the maximum bonus is associated with achievement of the maximum level
and the maximum yearly penalty is associated with performance at the default
level.
Inclusion of the maximum level is important for providing financial incentives that
are fully attainable by the concessionaire. Otherwise, concessionaires may never
be able to achieve the maximum bonus for certain measures. For example, a
perfect score is unrealistic for customer satisfaction and if the maximum bonus is
based on a perfect score. this may, reduce the concessionaire's incentive to
achieve the highest possible performance as the motivation to improve any
particular performance measure is presumably based somewhat on the
"incremental" bonus available. While a maximum level of 100% (or a perfect
score) is usually unrealistic, 100% may be used for ease of understanding and
administration when the maximum achievable may be close to perfect.
Consider, as an example, the NLR case with customer satisfaction selected as a
performance measure. Because customer satisfaction scores, on the London
Underground, typically range between 65 and 80, with an average of 75, the
selection of the default, expected, and maximum levels may be as follows:
Performance Measure Default Expected Maximum
Customer Satisfaction 60 75 85
Table 4-1: Possible Default, Expected, and Maximum Levels for Customer Satisfaction Scores
4.1.2 The Adaptive Process
In the first year of the concession, the expected level acts as the incentive and
penalty threshold, meaning performance above that level is rewarded and
performance below it is penalized. In subsequent years, incentive and penalty
thresholds may shift away from the initial expected level depending on the
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concessionaire's actual performance. The automatic resetting of the targets
allows the incentives to be effective over the entire contract period without having
to predict actual levels of performance for each year.
If actual concessionaire performance is above the expected level in a given year,
the next year's incentive threshold will be adjusted based on the level of
performance achieved and the incentive threshold in that year, as well as an
agency-specified p, where p is a percentage between 0 and 100:
New Threshold = Old Threshold + p (Level Achieved - Old Threshold) (4-1)
Figure 4-2 illustrates the incentive threshold adjustment in the second year of a
concession following a concessionaire achieved level of performance in the
bonus zone. Notice that the expected level serves as the incentive threshold in
the first year and that increasing the incentive threshold creates a neutral zone in
the second year since the penalty threshold (based on the initial expected level)
is unchanged.
Year 1:
Default Expected Maximum
Level Achieved
Year 2: New Incentive:
Threshold
Default Penalty Threshold Maximum
Figure 4-2: Incentive Threshold Upward Adjustment
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As the neutral term implies, no incentives or penalties are collected for
performance between the incentive and penalty thresholds (within the neutral
zone).
Note, as in Figure 4-3, incentive thresholds can be reduced, narrowing the
neutral region, if actual performance, in a year, is below the incentive threshold
for that year. The incentive threshold can change in this same manner from
year-to-year, however, it should never be reset below the initial expected level
just as penalty thresholds will never be reset above the initial expected level.
Year n:
Default Penalty Incentive Maximum
Level Achieved
Year n+1:
New Incentive
Threshold
Default Penalty Maximum
Figure 4-3: Incentive Threshold Downward Adjustment
Penalty thresholds are adjusted in the same fashion as the incentive thresholds
(Equation 4-1) if actual performance is worse than the initial expected level. In
some cases when actual performance hovers near the initial expected level, both
the penalty and incentive levels may be reset (up and down) in the same year,
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but in most cases, it is likely that only one of the thresholds will be reset in any
given year. The possibility of downward resetting provides a fair deal for
concessionaires in cases where the expected level is unrealistically high and it
encourages operators to make an effort to improve service, regardless of prior
performance. If performance degrades, a lowered threshold the next year
provides contractors with a stronger incentive to improve upon service so that
penalties will not be incurred again in the next year. Especially in cases where
the public agency has a significant amount of responsibility for the outcomes, the
contractor should not be repeatedly penalized for a poor initial setting of
expected performance.
As stated earlier, the incentive threshold, in a given year, shifts some percent of
the distance, p, between the incentive threshold and the level achieved in the
previous year. If p is set to 0% incentive thresholds are never adjusted and
target levels are non-adaptive, similar to more traditional models. Clearly, a p of
0% does not allow for the advantages of an adaptive performance regime. At the
other extreme, a p of 100% represents a fully adaptive model where the incentive
threshold in any given year is equal to the performance achieved in the previous
year, for each performance measure. A performance regime that is too reactive
may also be disadvantageous as concessionaires are, in this case, assessed
each year based solely on the service conditions and performance from the year
before. Therefore, for p equal to 100%, concessionaires may be penalized or
rewarded inappropriately for stochastic events and will not receive any future
bonus for maintaining previous improvements to service.
By moving the threshold a portion of the distance to the current performance
level and selecting a p significantly higher than 0% and lower than 100%, the
concessionaire maintains a (reduced) bonus payment for maintaining the same
level of performance as the prior year and contractors are still encouraged to
continue to improve as incentive targets are moved incrementally upward. As p
increases in value, adjusted incentive thresholds are closer to the level of
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performance achieved in the previous year than they are to the previous
incentive threshold. Meaning, for higher values of p, the performance regime is
more reactive, and year-to-year thresholds will fluctuate more whereas, lower
values of p result in a more incremental approach to adjusting thresholds. This
implies a high p value is appropriate for incentives that are closely linked to the
previous year's outcomes and a lower p should be assigned for incentives based
on the average achieved performance over the contract term.
4.1.3 "Floors" and "Ceilings" for the Penalty and Incentive Levels
The self-adjusting mechanism described in the previous section suggests that
the annual thresholds where penalties begin to be assessed and bonuses begin
to be earned can "float" anywhere within the range between the Default and
Maximum performance levels. In practice, neither the public agency nor a
potential contractor wants the thresholds to get too close to the extreme values,
as this would result in substantial penalties or incentives being applied for small
increments of performance (more on this in section 4.1.4). In addition, even in
the face of great uncertainty, both parties could probably estimate some limits
within the extreme range where all could agree that such performance should
either be rewarded or penalized. Accordingly limits are introduced: a "floor" on
how low the penalty threshold can fall, and a "ceiling" on how high the incentive
threshold can rise are established for each performance measure. Figure 4-4
depicts a possible selection of a penalty floor and incentive ceiling within the full
performance range.
Default Floor Expected Ceiling Maximum
I I I I I
4 -Penalty Zone Bonus Zone
Figure 4-4: Floor and Ceiling Levels
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The (penalty) floor and (incentive) ceiling should be selected by the agency in the
contract specification based largely on the information available on the likely
concessionaire performance for the proposed contract. If the initial expectation is
the likely (or average) performance in Year 1, then the floor and ceiling can be
interpreted as the likely range of performance over the life of the contract.
Alternatively, performance in the range between the floor and ceiling, where
targets are updated according to actual contractor performance, can be thought
of as a result of contractor behavior, agency action, and external factors, in an
unclear combination. In other words, within the range from the floor to the ceiling
there is uncertainty regarding the quality of contractor performance indicated by
the achieved level. The ceiling should be set so that performance above that
ceiling is a clear indication of good performance by the contractor. Being the
lower limit to the neutral range, the floor represents the level of performance
below which operator action, or inaction, is certainly contributing to substandard
service, and should be sanctioned accordingly.
The better an agency understands the future conditions, and expected
performance, the narrower the range of uncertainty is, and the closer the floor
and ceiling should be to the initial target. Conversely, higher levels of uncertainty
may correspond to a wider separation of the floor and ceiling as it is unclear what
levels of performance signify what quality of service provision from the
contractor.
Continuing with the NLR customer satisfaction example, possible designations of
the floor and ceiling are:
Performance Measure Default Floor Expected Ceiling Max
Customer Satisfaction 60 65 75 80 85
Table 4-2: Possible Floor and Ceiling Designation for Customer Satisfaction Scores
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Note that there is no reason that the setting of the floor and ceiling values need
be symmetrical around the initial expected level - the agency certainly can make
the judgment that either the penalty or incentive level should be allowed to shift
further than its counterpart.
4.1.4 Calculation of Payments
As thresholds move closer to their measure's maximum or default level, the
associated incentive payment should encourage improvements in contractor
performance as well as be relatively easy to calculate. While in more traditional
methods the incentive payment each year is based on a stationary target,
payment calculations under the proposed structure are more involved, since
thresholds shift from year-to-year. In order to employ a payment method which is
understandable, so that concessionaires can price their bids appropriately, and
which provides the desired incentive, various payment options were analyzed.
This section presents the two basic forms of payment method analyzed,
increasing slope payments and constant slope payments, and recommends the
increasing slope method for most cases, based on that analysis.
An interactive, spreadsheet-based computer model was developed in Microsoft
Excel to evaluate alternative regime structures. The important features included
in that model are:
- the ability to input test scenarios of possible contractor performance that
are interactive with the regime framework,
- an automatic resetting of the incentive and penalty target levels for each
subsequent year,
- an automatic computation of the resulting incentive or penalty payments,
and
- an automatic compilation of summary statistics such as the average
performance versus total incentive payments which could be useful if
multiple scenarios are run.
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The spreadsheet model was employed to analyze the different incentive payment
methods for various concessionaire performance scenarios and a summary of
the conclusions drawn from that process are presented in this section. The
detailed results of that analysis are included in Appendix B.
Increasing Slope Payments
The first type of payment evaluated calculates incentive payments based on
incremental rewards or penalties that increase as thresholds move towards the
ceiling or floor levels, respectively. Incentive payments, under this alternative,
generally depend on the incentive threshold level and the achieved performance
level. They will also depend on the maximum level established for the related
performance measure. In any given year, if the contractor's performance on a
specific measure is above the incentive threshold, the bonus paid will be
determined by the following formula:
Incentive Payment = (Achieved Level - Incentive Threshold) * (Maximum Bonus) (4-2)
(Maximum Level - Incentive Threshold)
The ratio term (second term) in equation 4-2 is equal to the unit bonus defined as
the amount of money associated with each unit of performance above the
incentive threshold for a particular measure. The unit bonus will, therefore, vary
each year based on the annually-adjusted incentive threshold. In general, the
higher the incentive threshold, the greater the incentive payment earned per unit
of improved performance, as illustrated in Figure 4-5. The solid line, in Figure 4-
5, represents the payment to the contractor for each level of achievable
performance that is greater than the expected level, in the first year. As the
incentive target is adjusted upwards, in following years, the slope of this line
increases until the maximum unit bonus is achieved when the incentive threshold
reaches its ceiling.
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Maximum
Bonus
_ Year One
Payment
Default Expected Year One Ceiling Maximum
Performance
Figure 4-5: Increasing Slope Payment Method
This means an incremental improvement in performance is rewarded by
increasing bonus payments as the ceiling is approached, with the highest
powered incentive available (per unit of performance) when the incentive
threshold reaches the ceiling. Therefore, similar to Laffont and Tirole's theory,
incentives become more high-powered as contractors prove themselves to be
more efficient. This scheme however, does not rely on contractors revealing
their efficiency levels during the bidding process, but instead iterates toward the
incentive power that is of the greatest utility to the contractor.
Penalties are assessed in much the same way, except the difference between
the achieved level and the penalty threshold is used in the calculation. In any
year, if a contractor's performance on a performance measure is below the
adjusted penalty threshold, the penalty due will be based on the following
formula:
Penalty Payment = (Penalty Threshold - Achieved Level) * (Maximum Penalty) (4-3)
(Default Level - Penalty Threshold)
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In order to gauge the impact of increasing slope payments on contractor
performance, payment levels were calculated for hypothetical scenarios
representing typical operator behavior over a seven year contract period (five
base years with a two year extension), with a p of 50%. The four scenario's
included represent steady improvement over the seven year term, front and
back-end loaded improvement, and improvement that fluctuates, or is uneven,
over the contract term, as illustrated in Table 4-3.
Cumulative % Improvement per Year
Performance Scenario 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Front-end 40 65 70 75 80 85 90
Steady 14 28 42 56 70 80 90
Back-end 5 10 15 30 50 70 90
Uneven 20 15 25 50 40 70 90
Table 4-3: Concessionaire Performance Scenarios
Figure 4-6 depicts the cumulative payment associated with each scenario's
cumulative percentage movement from the initial, expected level to the maximum
level, for all measures. The total possible incentive earned, over all measures,
is assumed to be E2.5 million per year, or E17.5 million over the life of the 7-year
contract. The incentive threshold has been adjusted each year as described
above (moved each year halfway between the prior year's threshold and the
current year's performance), subject to a ceiling of 50% of the difference between
the maximum level and initial expected level. It is important to note that although
each scenario represents different concessionaire behavior, all of the included
scenarios achieve the same level of performance by the end of the contract term,
that being 90% of the assumed maximum performance levels.
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Figure 4-6: Cumulative Increasing Slope Incentive Payments, Multiple Scenarios
Because this type of payment scheme offers an increasing unit bonus which
reaches a maximum at the ceiling level, there is an incentive for the contractor to
achieve high quality performance as quickly as possible. As is evidenced in
Figure 4-6, contractor performance characterized by front-end improvement is
more highly rewarded than behavior that achieves the same magnitude of
improvement later in the term of the contract. Incentives for steady improvement
fall in between those for front-end and back-end efforts, in terms of magnitude of
incentive payment. Payment for uneven improvement can fluctuate depending
on how quickly the ceiling level is attained and the magnitude of each decline in
performance levels. Because front-end improvement is more beneficial than
improvement spread evenly over the life of the contract which, in turn, is more
advantageous than back-end improvement, the increasing slope payment
scheme is observed to reward most strongly the most desirable response from
the contractor.
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Figure 4-7 illustrates the difference in hypothetical incentive payment earned,
under the increasing slope scheme, as the ceiling is moved further from the initial
target and closer to the maximum level.
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Figure 4-7: Cumulative Increasing Slope Payments, Multiple Ceilings
As in Figure 4-6, performance is represented as the cumulative percentage
movement from the expected level to the maximum level in Figure 4-7; in this
graph however, yearly performance levels are constant and represent steady
improvement in each case. As the ceiling is increased the total incentive
payment decreases, when performance is held constant. Since the ceiling
represents the level of performance where the agency is certain that
concessionaire action is contributing to improved service, it is logical that
increased ceiling levels are associated with decreased payments, when the
maximum bonus available and contractor performance are held constant.
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Constant Slope Payments
Under constant slope payment schemes, unlike the increasing slope scheme, the
unit bonus and unit penalty, do not change over the life of the contract and are
determined relative to the ceiling and floor levels, respectively. A maximum
bonus and penalty pool achievable.in any year is designated by the agency; the
bonus in any given year is then the minimum of: the maximum yearly bonus and
the result of equation 4-4.
(Achieved Level - Incentive Threshold) * (Maximum Yearly Bonus) (4-4)
(Maximum Level - Incentive Ceiling)
Figure 4-8 depicts constant slope incentive payments graphically. The solid line
represents payments due for each level of achieved performance in the first year,
where the slope is the unit bonus. The dashed line depicts the determination of
the unit bonus based on the ceiling level and the maximum yearly bonus.
Maximum Bonus
----------------------------------------------------- Year One
Payment
n n
Default Expected Year One Ceiling Maximum
Performance
Figure 4-8: Constant Slope Payment, Year One
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Penalties behave in the same manner, with the annual penalty being the
minimum of: the maximum yearly penalty and the result of Equation 4-5.
(Penalty Threshold - Achieved Level) * (Maximum Yearly Penalty) (4-5)(Default Level - Penalty Floor)
Under constant slope payments there is a constant incentive for marginal
improvements. In other words, a bonus payment for achieving two points over
the expected level, in year one, is equal to the payment for achieving two points
above an updated incentive threshold, in any other year, subject to the yearly
cap. However, a constant unit bonus results in a decreased incentive to achieve
ceiling levels when compared to the increasing slope scheme. In fact, in years
when the incentive target is unrealistic, there may be a disincentive for the
concessionaire to put forth maximum effort, under the constant slope method, as
any decrease in the incentive threshold will not affect the unit bonus.
In Figure 4-10, the cumulative incentive payment earned under the constant
slope method is plotted against the cumulative percentage of maximum
performance achieved for four different hypothetical scenarios of contractor
behavior (see Table 4-3), as solid lines. As in the increasing slope case, the total
possible incentive earned, over all measures, is assumed to be E2.5 million in
each year or E17.5 million over the contract term. Please note that these
representations of operator performance are equivalent to the scenarios used to
evaluate the increasing slope payment method. The results of the increasing
slope method are also graphed, in Figure 4-10, as dashed lines. The cumulative
performance level achieved is 90% for all cases.
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Figure 4-10: Cumulative Constant & Increasing Slope Payments, Multiple Scenarios
From Figure 4-10 it is evident that the constant slope method offers incentives
similar to the increasing slope scheme for front-end improvement relative to
steady and back-end effort. However payments under the constant slope
alternative are larger than they would be for the same performance under the
increasing slope method when the ceiling and floor designation and the
maximum yearly pools are held constant. This is because the unit bonus, under
the constant slope method, is higher in the early years of the contract than it
would be under the increasing slope method, for equivalent pool sizes.
Additionally, as the ceiling (and/or floor levels) are increased in the constant
slope scheme, the unit bonus is increased so that the maximum bonus is
achievable through incremental improvements in performance (or maximum
penalty achieved for incremental decreases in performance) each year. This
implies a careful designation of the ceiling and floor levels simultaneous with pool
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and weight selection to ensure that the maximum bonus or penalty is only
achieved through appropriate concessionaire performance.
In summary, both increasing and constant slope payments offer similar
incentives for front-end improvement relative to steady and back-end
improvement,. However, an increasing unit bonus rewards concessionaires at
higher rates as performance approaches the ceiling, so there is a stronger
incentive to achieve high levels of performance. Furthermore, payments to the
concessionaire continue to decrease as ceiling levels are increased, under the
increasing slope method, while the opposite is true for payments under the
constant slope method.
For these reasons, increasing slope payments are recommended for the general
case of uncertainty regarding future service conditions-. This payment method
can motivate concessionaire improvement early in the concession and continues
to reward concessionaires later in the contract period for constant improvement
as well as maintaining a portion of the incentives and penalties for very good or
very poor performance that doesn't change much in later years.
There may be some cases where the constant slope method is more effective,
however. If achieving the ceiling, or high levels of performance, is unlikely over
the term of the contract then the increasing slope method may not provide an
effective incentive. In this case, the maximum yearly bonus (or cap) under the
constant slope method would represent the bonus associated with the maximum
feasible year-to-year improvement. Alternatively, if the cost and/or effort required
of the concessionaire to improve performance does not increase as incentive
thresholds are adjusted upwards, constant slope payments may be appropriate
since they provide a constant unit bonus.
An important characteristic of both appoaches is that the concessionaire always
retains a portion of a prior year's bonus with constant performance, and they can
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still receive the maximum incentive by achieving the maximum feasible levels.
Based on either payment construct proposed here, the closer the floor and
ceiling are to the extreme values, the larger the maximum penalty or incentive
per unit change in performance can be in any given year (subject to the pre-set
maximum penalty and incentive pools). Therefore, while the primary
determinants of the floor and ceiling values should be the expected range of
performance, it is probably more desirable to err on the side of a higher floor and
lower ceiling when estimating these values in the pre-contract period for each
performance measure.
4.1.5 Incentive and Penalty Pools and Weights
To calculate the incentives due, a maximum pool of funds available for bonus
payments for all performance measures is determined. Similarly there is a
limited pool of penalties that can be collected in any year. The full incentive pool
is achieved only through attainment of the maximum level for all performance
measures, in that year. The entire penalty pool will only be collected if the
concessionaire performs at or below the default level in all measures that year.
Both the annual penalty and incentive pools are either constant for the contract
term or may increase at some nominal rate each year based on the expected
increases in contract cost.
Since incentive and penalty pools are associated with multiple measures,
weights are assigned to each measure. These weights represent the portion of
the pool that is allocated to a specific measure in a specific year. For instance, if
on-time performance is given a weight of 0.30, then 30% of the pool in a given
year is awarded for attaining the maximum level of on-time performance. For a
particular measure, weights assigned for penalizing and rewarding performance
may differ as weights should reflect both the priorities of the agency, and the
effort needed to improve on a particular aspect of performance. Weighting may
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change over the term of the contract to reflect a change in agency priorities or
concessionaire effort required.
A correct allocation of the weights is essential to align the concessionaire's
priorities with those of the public agency. Improperly balanced weights can be
especially problematic in the case of conflicting objectives and their related
measures of performance. In these cases, it is important that the selected
weights reflect the relative priority of the objectives.
Measures with extremely high or low weights may not be appropriate for
inclusion in the performance regime. If the authority values a performance
measure at an exceptionally high weight, for example 90%, that aspect of
performance is overwhelmingly important and should be included as a
requirement in the contract for service. By the same token, very low weightings,
such as 2%, imply that the related aspect of performance is of little importance,
and will probably receive little attention from the concessionaire.
Note also that performance measures associated only with an incentive are given
a 0% weight in the penalty pool, just as performance measured only for the
determination of penalties are assigned a 0% weight in the incentive pool.
An agency should select pool sizes carefully, relative to expected cost of the
contract, and to the desired power of the incentive. Pool sizes which are too
small, will not get concessionaire attention sufficient to motivate high quality
performance and may not attract the desired level of competition in the bidding
phase. On the other hand, pools offering incentives much larger than the
associated cost of improvement represent a bad deal for the public. Therefore,
the authority should attempt to size the incentive pools so they correspond to the
amount of cost and attention necessary from the operator to achieve the
associated level of performance.
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While estimating costs during periods of significant uncertainty is difficult, the
agency should use any information available to determine the lowest price
incentive that can still be effective. Agencies may refer to contracts for more
stable services to gain an understanding of incentive power in terms of the
percent of the contract price awarded for improved performance. Alternatively,
the contractor's estimated staffing costs, and possibly other variable costs, could
be used to determine a figure for "avoidable" costs, or costs that the operator
may reduce over time. Then, incentive pools could be set according to the
amount of avoidable cost to encourage the contractor to value improved
performance over reduced costs. Another potential method for determining the
size of the annual pool is to estimate the contractor's expected profits and set the
maximum incentive and penalty pools at 50-100% of the estimated profits.
The incentive and penalty pools can be set independently, just as incentive and
penalty performance measures and weights may differ. It is recommended that
the total amount of incentives available outweigh the total amount of penalties, in
order to maintain the desired relationship with the concessionaire. When
incentives outweigh penalties, the contractor is more likely to see the public
authority as a partner rather than an adversary, and the authority's attempts to
monitor and correct aspects of service operations will be more justifiable.
Additionally, contractor's bid prices may decrease if expected profits are greater
than potential penalties.
Finally, annual pools may be increased if the contractor's costs are expected to
increase, or to provide a greater incentive. For example, increasing the incentive
pool by a portion of the amount of money collected in penalties may encourage
the contractor to "earn back" some of the penalties lost in the previous year by
performing at higher levels.
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4.1.6 Restarting Target Setting
As defined, all thresholds are set for the first year only, and incentive and penalty
target thresholds for the remaining years are then automatically adjusted from
year to year. However, there may be exceptions to this rule. If the achievable
level of performance is expected to change significantly at some point during the
contract, that measure may be reset with a new expected level of performance.
For example, if the delivery of fare gates in year three of the contract is expected
to decrease the level of ticketless travel by 50% (where less ticketless travel is
desirable), it is reasonable to assign an initial penalty threshold level for year
three that is 50% lower (more difficult) than the level in year one. In this case,
performance in year two would not affect the new threshold level in year three. A
restart of the threshold-setting process can be triggered by an event, or at a
specific time, but should be fully defined beforehand, within the contract.
4.2 THE REVENUE/RIDERSHIP INCENTIVE
To retain the desired amount of control over changing service, fares, and other
operating conditions, it is often wise for the agency to retain the revenue and/or
ridership risks. Retention of revenue may also be motivated by a desire to
reduce the risk to the contractor when the agency has control over major
investment and planning decisions. In this case, defined earlier as a gross cost
contract, a general revenue or riderhip incentive may be of value for the following
reasons:
- to focus the concessionaire on the central mission of any transit service -
that is, to attract riders who will regularly use that service;
- to balance the natural inclination of any concessionaire holding a gross
cost contract to focus on reducing the costs of the service and only those
specific performance measures to which incentives and penalties have
been attached;
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- to provide a meaningful incentive for all of the intangible or difficult to
measure factors which a concessionaire must demonstrate to attract new
riders and revenue;
- to establish a true "gain-sharing" cooperative spirit within the contractual
framework which may attract more quality bidders; and
Also, such an incremental incentive is efficient as it will result in bonus payments
only when excess revenue is available and risk-free to the agency.
Because revenue and ridership predictions are also plagued by uncertainty,
aspects of the resetting process described previously in the regime component
associated with specific aspects of performance can also be included in the
revenue incentive.
The determination whether to directly reward excess revenue or ridership for this
incentive should depend on the agency's goals for the service. If the primary
objective is to increase ridership from all market segments, then a patronage
incentive is most appropriate, as it would encourage concessionaires to
"accommodate all types of travelers and may especially induce more free
student travel, or other categories of discounted fares, that would not be
rewarded with a revenue-only incentive. A ridership incentive may also avoid
windfall gains for the concessionaire if the agency plans to increase fares.
Perhaps the largest downside to a ridership incentive is greater difficulty in
monitoring and measuring ridership" (Attanucci, 2006) if the appropriate
technology is not in place.
A direct revenue incentive, on the other hand, may be more simply defined and
monitored in the case of automatic ticketing systems, as the "full" revenue
allocation need not be included in the incentive scheme. A revenue incentive
can also be more easily budgeted for and would not be subject to occasional
"blips" (such as an influx of students riding free) since one can assume that the
agency will aim to increase revenue slowly at or slightly above the rate of
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inflation. Additionally, a revenue incentive is tied to ticketless travel and fare
evasion while the opposite may be true for ridership measures. In the special
case of significant fare increases the "excess" revenue target can be adjusted by
a weighted average increase yield expected from the fare increase.
Since the agency is retaining the downward revenue risk, this incentive should
only result in bonuses for the concessionaire if certain revenue or ridership
targets are exceeded. To ensure bonuses are deserved, and not the result of
exogenous factors, the additional incentive is available to the contractor only if
performance for all other measures results in a net performance bonus. The
revenue/ridership incentive allows the contractor to retain some portion of the
revenue that is above that expected by the agency.
A base revenue target is predetermined for all years of the contract by the transit
agency. Contractors can be evaluated against an adjusted revenue target which
is predetermined systematically from year to year.
If the base revenue target is exceeded in the first year, the excess revenue will
be shared between the contractor and agency at a predetermined ratio. The
base revenue target for the second year is then increased by the amount of
excess revenue retained by the agency in the initial year. The calculated value is
the adjusted revenue target for the second year.
Table 4-4 demonstrates the revenue sharing scheme, and calculation of adjusted
revenue targets for a hypothetical scenario. In this scenario, the contractor has
surpassed the year one base revenue target by $2 million. The $2 million is then
split, at a predetermined 40% to the contractor, leaving $1.2 million for the
government agency. The base revenue target for the second year is then
increased by the amount of excess revenue retained by the agency, making the
adjusted revenue target for year two $28.45 million.
98
Year Base Adjusted Percent of Actual Excess Excess Revenue
Revenue Revenue Excess to Revenue Revenue Retained by
Target Target Contractor Collected Retained by Concessionaire
Authority
1 25 40 27 1.2 0.8
2 27.25 28.45 40 - -
Table 4-4: Revenue Incentive, 1
If the revenue target in the first year was not met, the second year's base
revenue target will be adjusted downward. The adjusted revenue target for a
year following a shortfall is equal to the base revenue target for that year minus
the full shortfall from the previous target. Table 4-5 illustrates the calculation of
the adjusted revenue target in year three after a shortfall in year two.
Year Base Adjusted Percent of Actual Excess Excess Revenue
Revenue Revenue Excessto Revenue Revenue Retained by
Target Target Contractor Collected Retained by Concessionaire
I_ I Authority
1 25 40 27 1.2 0.8
2 27.25 28.45 40 28 -0.45 0
3 30 29.55 40 26 -3.55 0
4 32 29.55 40 - - -
Table 4-5: Revenue Incentive, 2
The adjusted revenue target in any year, though, cannot be less than the
adjusted revenue target in the previous year. As in the fourth year in Table 4-5,
the adjusted revenue target from the previous year will become the current year's
adjusted revenue target, when that value is greater than the current year's base
revenue target minus the shortfall from the previous year.
The adjusted revenue targets are calculated each year until the end of the
contract. This form of gain-sharing produces a strong incentive for any
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concessionaire to improve customer satisfaction and decrease ticketless travel.
Also, because only excess revenues are shared, the administering agency is not
threatening their own financial viability for the sake of the incentive.
The proportion of excess revenue awarded to the concessionaire should depend
on the ability of the concessionaire to increase revenue. If the contractor has
very little influence on revenues collected, they should retain less of the excess
revenue. However, since the agency's budgeted revenue will never decrease
when paying an excess revenue bonus with the above outlined scheme, it can be
advantageous to maximize a contractor's motivation by offering a significant (eg.
40-60%) share of the excess revenue in any year.
A summary of the performance regime structure proposed in this chapter, along
with suggestions for further research are presented in the concluding chapter.
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Chapter 5: Implementation of the Proposed Regime
As the proposed performance regime's structure is somewhat different from more
traditional approaches, some considerations related to the regime
implementation during contract design (5.1) procurement (5.2), and performance
monitoring (5.3) specific to the adaptive structure, are presented below.
5.1 CONTRACT DESIGN
The complexity of the regime structure, including interactions between incentive
pools, adaptive performance targets, ceiling and floor levels and measures'
weights, across multiple performance measures can allow for unintended
consequences if the regime's design is not tested before implementation. At
stake are the quality of service, reputation of the authority, financial sustainability
of the arrangement, and customers' satisfaction. The potential for problems may
change based on the contractor's culture and the stage of the concession.
Therefore, the performance regime should be evaluated for various types of
concessionaires and for the entire term of the contract.
To be able to test multiple scenarios quickly and easily, the performance
regime's framework should be formatted so it is easy to manipulate and so the
expected results of the performance regime are automatically computed and
available for scrutiny.
A simple approach for analyzing alternative specifications, using computer
spreadsheets, is presented in this research (see section 4.1.4 and Appendix B).
This type of evaluation depends on agency knowledge for the formulation of test
scenarios. Informed hypotheses on the impact and magnitude of external
factors, on the culture of potential concessionaires, and the magnitude and timing
of changes to service will be useful for estimating the outcomes of the
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performance regime. As an agency acquires more experience with the proposed
adaptive performance regime, a more sophisticated simulation model can be
developed that allows for more alternative structures to be input and evaluated.
5.1.2 Scenario Development and Testing
Once the model is functional, meaning scenarios of possible concessionaire
performance over the term of the contract can be input and the resulting updated
targets and levels of payment are output, testing of the framework can begin.
The output of the simulations, the level of payments made for hypothetical
performance achieved, can be used to judge the potential effectiveness of the
regime framework as well as to highlight points of weakness in the regime.
Answering the following four questions may aid in evaluation of the regime
specification.
1. Can the transit agency retain the desired amount of involvement with the
contractor and the service?
While issues regarding the amount of control over operations and planning are
best managed through an appropriate delegation of the responsibilities and risks,
specification of the performance regime may also have an impact on the amount
of agency involvement allowed.
If a large share of the control over service is given to the private operator, the
agency may not be able to effectively intervene with the operations of the
concessionaire. Additionally, if the amount of penalties expected far outweigh
the expected bonuses, the authority may be seen as an antagonist, and the
contractor may avoid working cooperatively with the authority.
In any case, clauses that require the concessionaires to report on the cause and
possible solutions to indicators of poor performance can compel the operator and
authority to be cooperative, as well as allow the authority some insight into the
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state of operations and the concessionaire's mindset. Another alternative is to
negotiate aspects such as pool sizes and targets with competent contractors.
2. Does the framework convey the transit agency's priorities to the
concessionaire and encourage the contractor to adopt those priorities?
Because the amount of effort or the costs to the operator to improve on specific
aspects of performance are likely to be unknown, it is difficult to assess whether
the performance regime expresses the authority's priorities in the correct order.
In other words, determining explicitly whether the expected utility to the
contractor for applying the most attention to top priority objectives is greater than
the expected utility to the concessionaire from focusing on lower priority
objectives may be impractical.
Bearing in mind the set of actions available to the concessionaire to improve
upon specific aspects of performance, including low cost or no cost options, the
agency can compare the simulated levels of performance with the associated
level of incentive payments to better understand which incentives are most
attractive to the contractor. Assuming that the contractor will take the "rational"
course of action that rewards them the greatest profit for the least exertion, the
agency should try to assess the weighting of each performance measure, and
adjust them as necessary.
3. Does the framework encourage the concessionaire to continually improve on
each selected aspect of service?
Although the structure of the performance regime, as proposed by this thesis,
intends to encourage the contractor to continually improve performance through
rising targets, that intention can be undermined by inappropriate specification.
For example, if the effort to achieve a target is not worth the associated reward,
the contractor may not be motivated to achieve that level of performance, where
the associated reward is established by the pool size and measure's weight.
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One way to answer this question is to assess, for each performance measure,
the level of payment that would be made to the contractor for improvements in
performance, starting at a variety of points along the range of achievable
performance. Improvement in performance within the penalty range is as
important to evaluate as improvement to above-average performance. The
payment associated with a move from one level of performance to a higher level
should seem a reasonable match for the effort required to make the
advancement, for any incremental improvement and for all measures. If a
payment appears to be inadequate when compared to the amount of effort
required to achieve the associated target, the pool size, targets, or weights may
not be appropriate. An inadequate pool size will probably be discernable across
all measures of performance, where an inadequate weight is evidenced only
through the related measure of performance.
Similarly, the bonus associated with the preservation of previous levels of
improvement should reflect the expense and effort required from the
concessionaire to maintain those levels of performance. Lower levels of p will
allow concessionaires to retain a larger portion of past bonuses when
performance does not degrade.
4. How does the framework affect the concessionaire's bid price and package?
Because the proposed structure is aimed at continually improving performance,
contractors may be concerned with aecreasing rewards due to increasing
incentive levels. Although, the increasing difficulty of incentive levels is balanced
by a similar resetting on the penalty side and an increasing rate of payment, it is
important to understand the contractors' impression of the performance regime
and how those impressions will affect the bid prices and packages.
Consider the balance of penalties and incentives expected as well as the
reputation of the authority in order to answer this question, recognizing that an
agency characterized as overly demanding and a regime that results in more
104
penalties than rewards can both lead to inflated bid prices from potential
contractors. If the authority, or regime, or the combination of the two seem
excessively difficult, qualified bidders may chose not to compete for the service.
Reduced competition will, in turn, drive up bid prices and may result in an
increase in cost to the agency that is not balanced by an increase in quality.
On the other hand, if contractors believe that a good return can be earned
through the contract for service, it is possible that bid prices will be lessened or
quotes on quality improved.
The resulting bid price and package will be strongly influenced by the amount of
competition as well, so an understanding of the market is useful when answering
this question. Additionally, the concessionaire's perceived risk may be alleviated
through a thorough explanation of the performance regime during procurement
(see section 5.2).
Because the performance regime is one cohesive package, changing aspects of
the regime to deal with a specific problem may result in the creation of new
challenges, or increases in cost to the agency. While design of the ideal
performance regime is infeasible, the benefits associated with a corrective action
should be balanced with any costs created. A comprehensive grasp of the
regime and an iterative specification process can allow for design of a
performance regime that aids in the production of higher quality service at a
lower cost to the public.
5.2 PROCUREMENT
Although the proposed regime is meant to foster a cooperative environment and
establish gain-sharing between the authority and concessionaire, the
performance regime may not be perceived as such by potential contractors if a
proper orientation to the structure is not provided. Because the regime, as
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proposed here, features increasing targets and an increasing unit penalty,
potential contractors may become focused on prospective risks and may dismiss
aspects which endeavor to provide a fair deal for the concessionaire. Since a
balanced interpretation of the performance regime, from interested bidders, can
lead to greater competition, a careful explanation of the regime terms and
arrangement is essential during the procurement phase.
Not only should a detailed explanation of the performance regime be presented
to potential concessionaires, but analysis of the risks involved should be shared.
For example, it is important to illustrate how the resetting of targets is likely to
affect payments to the concessionaire. Emphasizing the increasing unit bonus
(under the increasing slope payment method), the ability to retain a portion of
past incentive payments for maintaining previous levels of good performance,
and the possibility of the penalty targets being reset downwards, can help to
prove the regime structure is designed with the interests of both the agency and
the contractor in mind.
It is also important to explain the reasoning behind target placement in order to
provide convincing incentives to concessionaires. Default, floor, initial, ceiling,
and maximum levels must be placed appropriately and should be accepted as
achievable, by potential contractors, for the regime to be effective. If contractors
do not believe target levels to be reasonable little attention will be given to
realizing those levels or to improving service, and bid prices are likely to
increase.
Not only can competition be increased, but a spirit of cooperation can be
established very early on in the contracting process if the public agency makes a
real effort to communicate the aim of the performance regime and the
concession. Along the same vein, negotiation with qualified bidders during the
procurement stage on key features of the regime may decrease bid prices and
encourage greater cooperation.
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5.3 PERFORMANCE MONITORING
Finally, the last step in the implementation of the performance regime is to devise
a systematic plan to monitor performance and to manage the regime. This plan
should include specifications relating to the amount of data that will be collected,
how often that data is collected, and how it will be shared between the authority
and contractor. If data collection takes the form of a self-audit by the
concessionaire, the agency should establish methods to periodically verify the
collected data. Periodic data collection is not only necessary for the self-
adjusting nature of the regime but is also important for the government agency
"(1) to strengthen the commitment and responsibility of the enterprise
management (concessionaire); (2) to find out what the problems are and what
the government can do to help the enterprise; and (3) to enable the government
to update its budget with respect to revenues from the enterprise and any
subsidy payments. There should be no surprises at the end of the year" (World
Bank, 1995)
The level of performance in a given year used to calculate incentive payments
should be the same figure that is used to update the next year's targets. The
calculation of payments as well as updated incentive and penalty levels should
occur at the same time.
It is also beneficial to prepare a plan for making payments to the contractor. The
plan should outline the acceptable interval of time that can pass between
performance audits and payments (for both the contractor and agency) where
payments should be made as soon as possible after an audit. Prompt and
reliable payments from the agency to the operator can reduce concessionaire's
perceived risk in subsequent tendering processes.
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Chapter 6: Conclusions and Suggestions for Further
Research
This chapter includes a summary of the expected outcomes of the proposed
performance regime structure in section 6.1, and suggestions for further research
in section 6.2.
6.1 SUMMARY
Although public private partnerships can potentially provide better, more efficient,
public transportation when compared to the efforts of the public sector alone, the
divergent interests of the private and public sector must be aligned in order to
provide the best deal for the public. Especially as large scale changes are
implemented on transit systems, a concessionaire focused primarily on cost
minimization can detract from the long-term success of the network and the
benefits to the public. Incentives, in the form of a performance regime, included
in the contract for service may encourage contractors to invest in the future of the
transit system where cost-cutting would have otherwise been more profitable. If
these incentives are not cost-efficient, however, scarce public funds may be
wasted.
Achieving a balance between effectiveness and efficiency in a performance
regime is not easy, and finding that balance when there is significant uncertainty
regarding future conditions on the system is even more difficult. Because it is
important for concessionaires to perform well on transitional services, and
because the performance regime was considered the best available tool to
encourage contractors to do so, a new form of performance regime was
designed to deal with uncertainty.
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The main feature of the performance regime is adaptive resetting of performance
targets to reflect real service conditions. The performance regime is flexible so
targets specified during contract design, based on incomplete information, can be
adjusted during the concession based on more up-to-date information. In this
way, targets that are unrealistic are adjusted downwards so concessionaires are
not over penalized but are provided with a real incentive to put forth extra effort
and earn bonuses, encouraging them to perform well in any year regardless of
past experiences. By the same token, targets that are initially too low are
adjusted upwards, obliging contractors to improve performance to earn the same
or larger bonuses and allowing for cost-efficient incentives. Additionally, the
incremental adjustment of performance targets may encourage constantly
improving performance from the concessionaire, on aspects of service with a
large potential for improvement.
While the incentive strength is expected to be higher in the proposed
performance regime than in more traditional models (for uncertain service
conditions), the increased strength is not a result of larger incentives and
increased cost to the agency, but of a more efficient regime structure. As Laffont
and Tirole advocated, under the proposed design the incentive strength
increases as the concessionaire's efficiency at achieving objectives increases.
Additionally, the strength of incentive, or rate of bonus payment, offered uses
agency-observed indicators of operator performance to assess the
concessionaire's efficiency level. By providing incentive levels appropriate to
actual concessionaire efficiency, the agency is able to minimize the cost of
improvements.
Note that the constantly improving service quality, anticipated under this regime,
is not achieved by sacrificing the well-being of the concessionaire, rather, as the
incentive threshold moves only a portion of the distance (p) towards current
performance levels, contractors can still receive a bonus for maintaining previous
improvements to service. The inclusion of ceiling and floor threshold levels also
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protects the concessionaire from unrealistic standards. Because thresholds
cannot be reset above the ceiling, or below the floor, the concessionaire is
assured that very good performance will always be rewarded. Similarly very bad
performance will always be penalized. These levels can also serve as markers
to the public agency to track the concessionaire's progress towards performance
that would be considered above-average on more stable services.
The increasing slope payment method suggested in this performance regime
encourages concessionaires to improve service early in the contract and achieve
ceiling thresholds as quickly as possible. Because larger financial bonuses are
provided at the ceiling, contractors may be motivated not only to reach high
levels of performance as quickly as possible, but also to maintain those
performance levels.
Finally, an adaptive revenue incentive (for gross-cost contracts with agency
retained revenue risk) can encourage a focus on improved customer satisfaction
and revenue protection and allow concessionaires to use their discretion and
first-hand knowledge to achieve increased revenue effectively. Because the
revenue incentive is adaptive and based on expected target revenue levels,
excessive rents are avoided and the agency's finances are protected.
6.2 FURTHER RESEARCH
Although theoretical analysis has been completed, examining the regime's
expected response to common scenarios (see Appendix B), the proposed
structure has not yet been tested in a real-world application. Additionally,
because the proposed regime deals with uncertainty, very little relevant data is
available.
Only after real outcomes are available for scrutiny can a more meaningful
evaluation of the proposed performance regime be carried out. Therefore,
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further research involving this regime structure should include specification and
inclusion of the regime in a contract for service, and observation of the outcomes
during all stages of the contracting process. The effect of the proposed regime
on service, bid prices, the relationship between the authority and contractor,
contractor performance, and payment levels may then be better understood.
Better information can, in turn, lead to further research on public private
partnerships and contracts for service, as well as, improve the performance
regime structure suggested within this thesis.
Certain predictive tools would also aid in the future development of adaptive
performance regimes. While a simple computer model was developed in this
research to analyze alternative regime structures, development of a more
sophisticated simulation model that does not rely solely on agency-input
scenarios of hypothetical performance would be more valuable. Ideally this
model is a simulation including statistical models relating the projected effect of
exogenous factors on service conditions and the expected contractor response to
the regime's specifications. For this type of simulation to be successful, the
following steps should be completed:
1. understand which external factors are significant to the outcomes of the
concession
2. determine how the relevant factors affect each potential concessionaire
when combined with the effects of the regime specification
3. forecast the relevant factors for the term of the contract as input
4. output the expected, best case and worst case levels of performance for
each measure.
As more data becomes available it is increasingly possible to model
relationships, such as the effect of significant external factors on customer
satisfaction, based on statistical evidence. In order to improve the performance
regime for subsequent contracts, or to be better prepared for significant changes
to service on other parts of the network, transit agencies should collect and
analyze statistics relating to the change in service levels, the level of disruption to
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service, customer satisfaction and ridership levels, and any other relevant
variables, during periods of major change.
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Appendix A: Modeling the Relationship between Customer
Satisfaction and Ridership for the London Underground
Introduction
In an effort to provide high quality service to customers on the soon-to-be acquired
Silverlink Metro, Transport for London is considering including incentives based on
customer satisfaction in the concession contract for Silverlink service. Since these
incentives would take the form of monetary payments, TfL was also interested in the
relationship between customer satisfaction and ridership, and hence revenue on this line.
This report describes the analysis to investigate the relationship between customer
satisfaction and ridership and presents the results of that analysis.
Data Sources
Because Silverlink Metro (SLM) rail service has not been under TtfL control to date,
many of the data sources that Transport for London would normally have are not
available for analysis of Silverlink service. For example, detailed ridership counts on
SLM were not available and the Customer Satisfaction Survey (CSS), the tool that TfL
uses to assess customer satisfaction, has not yet been conducted on Silverlink. Because
these critical sources of information were not obtainable for SLM, the relationship
between ridership and CSS on the London Underground was studied instead. Ridership
counts at LU stations, line splits at those stations, and CSS scores for each line were used
in order to investigate the relationship between customer satisfaction and ridership.
Ridership counts represent full weekday passenger volumes at each station in any year.
However, these counts do not associate customers with lines at stations served by more
than one line. Line split data splits the weekday ridership at each station by line when
more than one line serves a station. In this analysis, data from all lines was used so that
the sample size would be large enough to produce meaningful results. Multiple years of
counts were used for each line.
Customer Satisfaction Surveys are conducted four times a year on the London
Underground. These surveys include questions relating to on-train service, and station
quality, as well as comprehensive evaluations such as value for money and overall
satisfaction. To be able to use the CSS data in conjunction with the annual ridership data,
the quarterly scores were aggregated to develop a representative annual figure.
The information in Table 1 summarizes the data set that was used to investigate the
relationship between ridership and customer satisfaction. From this table we see that
both increases and decreases in ridership are associated with the same CSS scores. We
can also notice that in the year with the highest average percent change in ridership,
1998, the London Underground lines received on average a moderate overall CSS score
of 75.4.
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Table 1: Summary of Data Set
YEAR:
1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
3% 1% -6%10%
75.4
Line Average
Bakerloo % Change Ridership 13% 1% 5% -2% -5% 3% 2%
Overall CSS 75.5 73.8 74.3 76.3 78.3 79.3 76.2
Central % Change Ridership 7% 4% 3% 4% -10% 8% 3%
Overall CSS 75.3 75.8 74.3 74.0 73.8 77.5 75.1
Circle % Change Ridership 12% -6% 0% -4% -13% 5% -1%
Overall CSS 75.0 73.5 73.0 72.5 71.3 76.0 73.5
District % Change Ridership 11% -2% -2% 1% -3% 6% 2%
Overall CSS 75.5 75.0 72.5 75.8 74.8 77.5 75.2
East London % Change Ridership 1061%* 4% 12% -7% 4% -3% 2%
Overall CSS 59.5* 79.3 75.5 79.3 77.3 75.3 77.3
Hammersmith % Change Ridership 13% -11% 7% -5% -7% 5% 0%
Overall CSS 75.0 73.5 73.0 72.5 71.3 76.0 73.5
Jubilee % Change Ridership 4% 3% -4% 24% 5% 9% 7%
Overall CSS 79.3 77.5 77.3 78.5 78.0 78.8 78.2
Metropolitan % Change Ridership 10% -3% 9% -7% -4% 4% 2%
Overall CSS 76.5 76.3 74.8 74.8 73.3 75.5 75.2
Northern % Change Ridership 13% 4% 5% 2% -9% 6% 4%
Overall CSS 71.0 75.0 73.8 75.5 74.8 76.3 74.4
Piccadilly % Change Ridership 9% -5% -1% 0% -5% 4% 0%
Overall CSS 75.8 74.8 74.8 75.3 77.3 79.8 76.3
Victoria % Change Ridership 5% -1% 6% -1% -6% 7% 2%
Overall CSS 75.5 73.8 72.3 72.5 74.5 76.3 74.1
Yearly Average % Change Ridership
YearlyAverage Overall CSS
-2%
74.9 74.0 74.8 74.7
6%
77.3
* omitted from the data set
Figures 1 and 2 show the Ridership and Overall CSS scores for each line for the years
1998 and 2000 through 2004 (note data was not available for 1999). Only one obvious
outlier was omitted from the data set: the East London line for the year 1998 during
which it was undergoing a major extension.
From Figure 1 we can see that the data points for each line generally show little variation
in ridership as the Overall CSS score varies. In other words, the overall CSS scores for
each line typically range in the 70s, while the variation in ridership level for each line
over this time series is eclipsed by the large ridership differences across lines. In
addition, from either Figure 1 or 2 it is impossible to see any relationship between
Ridership and CSS scores.
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Ridership vs. Overall CSS
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Analysis
Linear regression was utilized to better understand the available data. Using regression, a
linear relationship between some measure of ridership (the dependent variable) and some
measure of customer satisfaction (the independent variable) could be estimated in the
form of:
Ridership = a + b (Customer Satisfaction)
In regression analysis the values of a and b which minimize the sum of squares of the
differences between the actual and estimated values of the dependent variable are
determined. In this case, we wanted to determine if there is a strong relationship between
ridership and customer satisfaction. Additional independent variables could be included
in the regression to more fully define this relationship.
Ridership: Dependent Variable
To obtain significant results, the ridership variable must be carefully defined. Using the
raw ridership by line, for example, would never result in a meaningful relationship.
Without normalizing the ridership counts by line, lines with high ridership and lines with
low ridership, independent of customer satisfaction, would conceal any relationship
which might exist (see Figure 2 for example).
Since we have time series data for each line the obvious way to specify the ridership
variable is annual change in ridership which could be either an absolute or percentage
change compared with the prior year. The percent change in ridership produced more
significant results, and so it was chosen as the dependent variable. It is reasonable that
the percent change in ridership is a better indicator of ridership impact across all lines,
since the absolute change does not account for variation in the magnitude of ridership
observed on the different lines.
Customer Satisfaction: Independent Variable
There were also different variables that were considered as the indicator for customer
satisfaction:
* Overall Satisfaction - score based on a single question to the survey
participant regarding their overall evaluation of service
* Average Satisfaction - an unweighted average of the scores of all the
questions answered by a survey participant
* Value for Money - score based on a single question to the survey participant
regarding their perception of the value for their money paid for service
The relationship between these three satisfaction indicators and ridership was explored
and the overall satisfaction variable was the only indicator which was positively
correlated with ridership. In other words, both average satisfaction and value for money,
generally decreased as ridership increased. Since the overall satisfaction variable was
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also the satisfaction indicator to produce the strongest results in the regression with
ridership as the dependent variable, it was chosen to represent satisfaction.
To be consistent with the change in ridership as the dependent variable, a change in
satisfaction independent variable was also tested. This variable is equal to the change in
overall satisfaction from the previous year for each line. However, the regression using
change in overall CSS as the only independent variable did not produce significant
results, so the actual overall satisfaction score for the year and line was used in all
subsequent analyses.
Base Case
Figure 3, shows the percent change in ridership versus overall CSS by line and supports
the use of percent change in ridership to normalize the data across lines. The data points
for each rail line are no longer separated by line as they are in Figure 1, but seem to be
dispersed with higher CSS scores generally indicating a larger ridership increase (or a
smaller ridership decrease).
Figure 4 also shows the same data but without differentiation by line. The red line in
Figure 4 represents the best fit regression relationship. If we compare the red line to the
scatter plot of data that it is modeling, we can see that there is still a lot of variation that is
not accounted for. In other words, while the relationship between percent change in
ridership and overall CSS is statistically significant, these two variables are not highly
correlated. The large amount of unexplained variation is probably due to the multitude of
external factors that affect ridership such as the strength of the economy, fare levels,
travel time, and congestion charging to name only a few.
The definition of the ridership variable and the satisfaction indicator allow us to estimate
the following base relationship:
Percent Change in Ridership = -71 + 0.969 (Overall CSS Score)
Based on a T-statistic of 2.415 for the satisfaction estimator it can be asserted with 98%
confidence that the Overall CSS score is a significant factor in explaining the change in
ridership for London Underground lines. While the Overall CSS score is a significant
estimator, an adjusted R2 value of 0.07 for this regression reinforces the previous
observation that the lion's share of variation in ridership is not accounted for by customer
satisfaction: specifically, customer satisfaction accounts for less than 10% of the total
variation observed in ridership in this data set.
This model suggests that an overall CSS score of approximately 73, typically results in
no ridership loss or gain over the previous year and each point in excess of 73 will, on
average, be associated with an increase in ridership of almost one percent.
117
Percent Change in Ridership vs. Overall CSS
Figure 3: By Line Figure 4: Regression Fit
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More Complex Models
Beyond the base case, there were several other hypotheses about the relationship between
ridership and customer satisfaction that were tested:
" Changes in ridership lag changes in satisfaction as it takes time for people to
change their travel behavior.
* Different aspects of service have different impacts on customer behavior. For
example, train attributes may be more important than station attributes.
" As ridership levels increase, side effects like crowding may affect satisfaction,
confounding this relationship.
" Both the absolute CSS score and the change in CSS from the previous year may
affect ridership. For instance, regular customers may appreciate small
improvements in station appearance and/or train cleanliness, while new customers
will be influenced by absolute performance rather than change in performance.
Regressions with additional, case specific, independent variables were carried out for
each of the hypotheses. The significance (t-statistic) of the relevant, independent variable
as well as the goodness of fit (adjusted R2) of the estimated line were both evaluated to
either accept or reject the hypothesis.
None of these hypotheses proved to be supported based on regression analyses, the
results of which are summarized in the appendix.
Conclusion
While it can be concluded that customer satisfaction does have an effect on ridership, it is
clear that the satisfaction indicators investigated explain only a small amount of the
ridership variation observed. Factors other than customer satisfaction explain over 90%
of the variation in the ridership data.
Customer satisfaction is important to increasing ridership, and efforts to increase
satisfaction should be rewarded. However, because of the great variation between the
actual data points and the estimated values (due to the great influence of external factors);
customer satisfaction alone is not a reasonable predictor of ridership changes.
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Regression Results
Regressions 1 through 3 were used to determine whether absolute change or percent
change is a better measure of ridership. Note that regressions 1 and 2 achieve an inflated
R squared value due to the inclusion of the East London outlier.
1. Absolute Change in Ridership with Overall CSS (including East London outlier)
R2 = .013
A Ridership = -56099 + 824 (Overall CSS)
t-statistic (-.85) (0.93)
The low R squared value of 0.013 indicates that only 1.3% of the observed ridership
variation is accounted for by this estimation of the relationship between ridership and
satisfaction. Each estimated variable in a regression has a corresponding t-statistic which
can be used to establish the explanatory power of that variable. For a t-statistic above
1.96 we can conclude, with 95% confidence, that a variable is significant for explaining
some portion of the variation observed in the dependent variable. While the variables in
a model may achieve high t-statistics, the formulation of that regression may be
incomplete and therefore a poor estimate of the actual data.
2. Percent Change in Ridership with Overall CSS (including East London outlier)
R2 = .450
Adjusted R2 = -.441
% A Ridership = -2322 - 30.7 (Overall CSS)
T-statistic (-7.28) (-7.23)
This regression estimates a relationship between ridership and satisfaction that is
negatively correlated, which can be observed in the negative sign of the satisfaction
estimator. Because we believe that ridership should increase as satisfaction increases, the
results of this regression are unacceptable.
3. Percent Change in Ridership with Overall CSS (excluding East London outlier)
R2 = .085
Adjusted R2 = .070
% A Ridership = -71 + 0.969 (Overall CSS)
T-statistic (-2.35) (2.42)
While an R squared value of 0.085 implies that this regression only weakly describes the
variation in ridership, both the constant and the satisfaction estimator obtained t-statistics
that support their inclusion in a more fully defined formulation. This regression was used
as the base case for testing more complex relationships between ridership and
satisfaction. The adjusted R squared is the evaluator used to compare across different
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regression models with the same dependent variable. In this case the adjusted R squared
of 0.07 is low.
In an attempt to be consistent with the form of the change in ridership, dependent
variable, a change in overall CSS, independent variable was regressed.
4. Percent Change in Ridership with Change in Overall CSS
R2 = .010
Adjusted R2 = -.009
% A Ridership = 0.475 + 0.228 (A Overall CSS)
T-statistic (0.53) (0.73)
The adjusted R squared for this regression is significantly lower than that of the base case
(regression 3) and none of the t-statistics indicate descriptive estimators. Therefore,
actual CSS score, and not change in CSS, was chosen as the satisfaction indicator.
Regressions 5 through 8 were conducted to investigate more complex formulations of the
relationship between ridership and satisfaction.
5. Percent Change in Ridership with Lagged Overall CSS
R2 = .006
Adjusted R2 = -.013
% A Ridership = 12.8 - 0.198 (lagged Overall CSS)
T-statistic (0.60) (-0.57)
Because the adjusted R squared is decreased relative to the base case, there are no
acceptable t-statistics, and the sign for the satisfaction estimator is negative, this
regression was rejected.
6. Percent Change in Ridership with Overall CSS and Change in Overall CSS
R2 = .163
Adjusted R2 = .130
% A Ridership = -92.4 + 1.2 (Overall CSS) + 0.1 (A Overall CSS)
T-statistic (-3.06) (3.08) (0.032)
Although the results of this regression suggest that the formulation is improved over the
base case, the improvement in explanatory power is actually due to a reduction of the
sample. Since the t-statistic for the only additional variable (A Overall CSS) is extremely
low, this regression was rejected.
7. Percent Change in Ridership with Average Train CSS and Average Station CSS
R2 = .148
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Adjusted R2 = .022
% A Ridership = -8.0 + 0.6 (Train CSS) - 0.5 (A Station CSS)
T-statistic (-0.26) (1.18) (-0.89)
This regression was rejected because the adjusted R squared is decreased relative to the
base case and there are no acceptable t-statistics.
8. Percent Change in Ridership with Overall CSS and Level of Ridership Dummy
R2= .103
Adjusted R2 = .074
% A Ridership = -75.3 + 1.0 (Overall CSS) + 2.2 (Ridership Dummy)
T-statistic (-2.48) (2.53) (1.11)
This regression was rejected because the t-statistic for the additional variable is not
significant.
Descriptive Statistics
Entries Exits Average CSS Overall CSS Value for $
N Valid 66 66 66 66 66
Mean 282842 284845 74 75 62
Median 282528 289187 74 75 62
Std. Deviation 156433 157391 2.2 2.9 2.6
Minimum 16957 13093 70.0 59.5 52.8
Maximum 544020 533961 79.0 79.8 68.5
Percentiles 25 137663 139920 72.8 73.8 60.2
50 282528 289187 73.8 75.3 62.3
75 430769 434437 75.8 76.3 63.3
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Appendix B: Analysis of Alternative Payment Methods
An example of the spreadsheet format used to analyze each hypothetical scenario is
illustrated below in Figure B- 1. Notice that each year of the contract and each potential
performance measure is evaluated. In this model, the measures, target levels, weights and
simulated levels of performance are input and the adjusted threshold levels and incentive
payments are automatically calculated.
Annual Pool Amounts:
Incentive = 2,500,000
Penalty = -1,750,000
Floor = 15% of distance from initial to Default
Ceiling = 15% of distance from initial to Maximum
Performance Regime
(Base)
Target Levels Weight
Simulated Pen/Inc Yearly
Year Measure Default Penalty Incentive Max Incentivew Penaftyw Level Achieved Subtotal
1 Ticketless Travel 40.0% 32.5% NA NA 0% 15% 32.5% E0.00
1 % Complete Trips 90.0% 96.0% 96.0% 100% 30% 25% 96.0% E0.00
1 % On-time Trips 75.0% 87.0% 87.0% 98.5% 30% 25% 87.0% £0.00
1 MSS Score 65 72 72 85 25% 20% 72 E0.00
1 CSS Score 65 72 72 85 15% 15% 72 £0.00 E0.002 Ticketless Travel 35.0% 27.5% NA NA 0% 15% 27.5% E0.00
2 % Complete Trips 90.0% 96.0% 96.0% 100% 30% 25% 96.0% E0.00
2 % On-time Trips 75.0% 87.0% 87.0% 98.5% 30% 25% 87.0% E0.00
2 MSS Score 65 72 72 85 25% 20% 72 E0.00
2 CSS Score 65 72 72 85 15% 15% 72 E0.00 E0.003 Ticketless Travel 30.0% 22.5% NA NA 0% 15% 22.5% E0.00
3 % Complete Trips 90.0% 96.0% 96.0% 100% 30% 25% 96.0% E0.00
3 % On-time Trips 75.0% 87.0% 87.0% 98.5% 30% 25% 87.0% E0.00
3 MSS Score 65 72 72 85 25% 20% 72 E0.00
3 CSS Score 65 72 72 85 15% 15% 72 E0.00 E0.00
4 Ticketless Travel 25.0% 17.5% NA NA 0% 15% 17.5% E0.00
4 % Complete Trips 90.0% 96.0% 96.0% 100% 30% 25% 96.0% E0.00
4 % On-time Trips 75.0% 87.0% 87.0% 98.5% 30% 25% 87.0% E0.00
4 MSS Score 65 72 72 85 25% 20% 72 E0.00
4 CSS Score 65 72 72 85 15% 15% 72 E0.00 E0.005 Ticketless Travel 22.5% 15.0% NA NA 0% 15% 15.0% £0.00
5 % Complete Trips 90.0% 96.0% 96.0% 100% 30% 25% 96.0% E0.00
5 % On-time Trips 75.0% 87.0% 87.0% 98.5% 30% 25% 87.0% E0.00
5 MSS Score 65 72 72 85 25% 20% 72 E0.00
5 CSS Score 65 72 72 85 15% 15% 72 E0.00 E0.006 Ticketless Travel 20.0% 12.5% NA NA 0% 15% 12.5% E0.00
6 % Complete Trips 90.0% 96.0% 96.0% 100% 30% 25% 96.0% E0.006 % On-time Trips 75.0% 87.0% 87.0% 98.5% 30% 25% 87.0% E0.00
6 MSS Score 65 72 72 85 25% 20% 72 E0.006 CSS Score 65 72 72 85 15% 15% 72 E0.00 E0.00
7 Ticketless Travel 17.5% 10.0% NA NA 0% 15% 10.0% E0.00
7 % Complete Trips 90.0% 96.0% 96.0% 100% 30% 25% 96.0% E0.00
7 % On-time Trips 75.0% 87.0% 87.0% 98.5% 30% 25% 87.0% E0.00
7 MSS Score 65 72 72 85 25% 20% 72 E0.00
7 CSS Score 65 72 72 85 15% 15% 72 E0.00 E0.00
Figure B-1: Model Spreadsheet Format
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The results of each spreadsheet were summarized and the summarized results for equivalent
payment methods, initial targets, and ceiling and floor designations were compiled, as in Figure
B-2. The analysis presented here is based on ap equal to 50%. The left-most column describes
each hypothetical scenario of concessionaire performance including the percentage of the
difference between the expected and maximum levels achieved each year, with the cumulative
percent accomplished over the contract term in parentheses. The levels of performance achieved
are shown for each measure and each year along with the hypothetical incentive payment due in
each year assuming a maximum annual bonus of f2.5 million. The last columns present the
average levels of performance achieved, the total incentive payment, and the net present value of
the incentive payments at the start of the contract.
While the scenarios of hypothetical contractor performance are equivalent in all summary sheets
presented below, the designation of the floor and ceiling levels is varied. The floor and ceiling
levels were placed at some percentage of the distance between the initial expected level and the
default or maximum level, respectively. For example a ceiling set at 50%, is halfway between
the initial expected level and the maximum level.
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Description Measure Year = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Average/Sum NPV
Base % Complete Trips 96% 96% 96% 96% 96% 96% 96% 96%
Initial performance % On-time Trips 87% 87% 87% 87% 87% 87% 87% 87%
level maintained for CSS Score 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72
all years MSS Score 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72
Ticketless Travel 33% 28% 23% 18% 18% 15% 13% 20%
Penalty/Incentive 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Steady I % Complete Trips 97% 97% 98% 98% 98% 99% 99% 98%
yrs 1-5:14 % On-time Trips 89% 90% 92% 93% 93% 95% 96% 93%
yr 6: 10 CSS Score 74 76 77 79 79 81 82 79
yr7:10 MSS Score 74 76 77 79 79 81 82 79
(90) Ticketless Travel 33% 28% 23% 18% 18% 15% 13% 20%
Penalty/Incentive 350,000 564,516 794,118 1,205,882 1,617,647 1,911,765 2,205,882 8,649,810 6,785,174
Steady 2 % Complete Trips 96% 97% 97% 97% 98% 98% 99% 97%
yrs 1-5:9 % On-time Trips 88% 89% 90% 91% 92% 93% 94% 91%
yr 6: 10 CSS Score 73 74 76 77 78 79 80 77
yr7:10 MSS Score 73 74 76 77 78 79 80 77
(65) Ticketless Travel 33% 28% 23% 18% 15% 13% 10% 20%
Penalty/Incentive 225,000 353,403 443,662 617,647 882,353 1,176,471 1,470,588 5,169,124 4,040,591
Front-end I % Complete Trips 98% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 98%
yr 1: 40 % On-time Trips 92% 94% 94% 94% 94% 94% 94% 94%
yr 2: 25 CSS Score 77 80 80 80 80 80 80 80
yrs 3-7: 0 MSS Score 77 80 80 80 80 80 80 80
(65) Ticketless Travel 33% 28% 23% 18% 15% 13% 10% 20%
Penalty/Incentive 1,000,000 1,470,588 1,470,588 1,470,588 1,470,588 1,470,588 1,470,588 9,823,529 8,061,193
Front-end 2 % Complete Trips 98% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 100% 99%
yr 1: 40 % On-time Trips 92% 94% 95% 96% 96% 97% 97% 95%
yr 2: 25 CSS Score 77 80 81 82 82 83 84 81
yrs 3-7: 5 MSS Score 77 80 81 82 82 83 84 81
(90) Ticketless Travel 33% 28% 23% 18% 15% 13% 10% 20%
Penalty/Incentive 1,000,000 1,470,588 1,617,647 1,764,706 1,911,765 2,058,824 2,205,882 12,029,412 9,737,383
Back-end 1 % Complete Trips 96% 96% 97% 98% 99% 100% 100% 98%
yrs 1-3: 5 % On-tine Trips 88% 88% 89% 92% 97% 97% 98% 93%
yr 4: 25 CSS Score 73 73 74 77 83 84 84 78
yr 5: 40 MSS Score 73 73 74 77 83 84 84 78
yrs 6-7: 5 Ticketless Travel 33% 28% 23% 18% 15% 13% 10% 20%
(90) Penalty/Incentive 125,000 192,308 233,333 821,678 1,911,765 2,058,824 2,205,882 7,548,790 5,772,958
Back-end 2 % Complete Trips 96% 96% 97% 97% 98% 99% 100% 98%
yrs 1-3: 5 % On-time Trips 88% 88% 89% 90% 93% 95% 97% 91%
yr 4: 15 CSS Score 73 73 74 76 79 81 84 77
yr 5-7: 20 MSS Score 73 73 74 76 79 81 84 77
(90) Ticketless Travel 33% 28% 23% 18% 15% 13% 10% 20%
Penalty/Incentive 125,000 192,308 233,333 541,958 1,029,412 1,617,647 2,205,882 5,945,540 4,522,272
Back-end 3 % Complete Trips 96% 96% 96% 96% 97% 98% 99% 97%
yrs 1-3: 0 % On-time Trips 87% 87% 87% 88% 90% 92% 94% 89%
yr4: 5 CSS Score 72 72 72 73 75 78 80 75
yr 5-7: 20 MSS Score 72 72 72 73 75 78 80 75
(65) Ticketless Travel 33% 28% 23% 18% 15% 13% 10% 20%
Penalty/Incentive 0 0 0 125,000 576,923 905,797 1,470,588 3,078,308 2,275,911
Uneven I % Complete Trips 97% 97% 97% 98% 98% 99% 100% 98%
yr 1: 20 yr 5: -10 % On-time Trips 89% 89% 90% 93% 92% 95% 97% 92%
yr 2: -5 yr 6: 30 CSS Score 75 74 75 79 77 81 84 78
yr 3: 10 yr 7: 20 MSS Score 75 74 75 79 77 81 84 78
yr 4: 25 Ticketless Travel 33% 28% 23% 18% 15% 13% 10% 20%
(90) Penalty/Incentive 500,000 138,889 357,143 1,029,412 735,294 1,617,647 2,205,882 6,584,267 5,108,495
Figure B-2: Increasing Slope Payment Method, Ceiling and Floor at 15%
125
Description
Base
Initial performance
level maintained for
all years
Steady I
yrs 1-5: 14
yr 6: 10
yr7:10
(90)
Steady 2
yrs 1-5: 9
yr 6: 10
yr7:10
(65)
Front-end I
yr 1: 40
yr 2: 25
yrs 3-7: 0
(65)
Front-end 2
yr 1: 40
yr 2: 25
yrs 3-7: 5
(90)
Back-end 1
yrs 1-3: 5
yr 4: 25
yr 5: 40
yrs 6-7: 5
(90)
Back-end 2
yrs 1-3: 5
yr 4: 15
yr 5-7: 20
(90)
Back-end 3
yrs 1-3: 0
yr 4: 5
yr 5-7: 20
(65)
Uneven I
yr 1: 20
yr 2: -5
yr 3: 10
yr 4: 25
(90)
yr 5: -10
yr 6: 30
yr 7: 20
Measure
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
PenaltylIncentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
Year=1 2 3 4 5 6
96%
87%
72
72
33%
0
97%
89%
74
74
33%
350,000
96%
88%
73
73
33%
225,000
98%
92%
77
77
33%
1,000,000
98%
92%
77
77
33%
1,000,000
96%
88%
73
73
33%
125,000
96%
88%
73
73
33%
125,000
96%
87%
72
72
33%
0
97%
89%
75
75
96%
87%
72
72
28%
0
97%
90%
76
76
28%
564,516
97%
89%
74
74
28%
353,403
99%
94%
80
80
28%
1,406,250
99%
94%
80
80
28%
1,406,250
96%
88%
73
73
28%
192,308
96%
88%
73
73
28%
192,308
96%
87%
72
72
28%
0
97%
89%
74
74
96%
87%
72
72
23%
0
98%
92%
77
77
23%
742,424
97%
90%
76
76
23%
443,662
99%
94%
80
80
23%
1,333,333
99%
95%
81
81
23%
1,500,000
97%
89%
74
74
23%
233,333
97%
89%
74
74
23%
233,333
96%
87%
72
72
23%
0
97%
90%
75
75
96%
87%
72
72
18%
0
98%
93%
79
79
18%
1,033,333
97%
91%
77
77
18%
521,638
99%
94%
80
80
18%
1,333,333
99%
96%
82
82
18%
1,666,667
98%
92%
77
77
18%
821,678
97%
90%
76
76
18%
541,958
96%
88%
73
73
18%
125,000
98%
93%
79
79
96%
87%
72
72
18%
0
98%
93%
79
79
18%
1,500,000
98%
92%
78
78
15%
666,667
99%
94%
80
80
15%
1,333,333
99%
96%
82
82
15%
1,833,333
99%
97%
83
83
15%
1,833,333
98%
93%
79
79
15%
931,373
97%
90%
75
75
15%
576,923
96%
87%
72
72
15%
0
99%
95%
81
81
15%
1,833,333
98%
93%
79
79
13%
1,000,000
99%
94%
80
80
13%
1,333,333
99%
97%
83
83
13%
2,000,000
100%
97%
84
84
13%
2,000,000
99%
95%
81
81
13%
1,500,000
98%
92%
78
78
13%
905,797
98% 99%
92% 95%
77 81
77 81
33% 28% 23% 18% 15% 13%
500,000 138,889 357,143 961,538 500,000 1,500,000
7 Average/Sum
96%
87%
72
72
13%
0
99%
96%
82
82
13%
2,166,667
99%
94%
80
80
10%
1,333,333
99%
94%
80
80
10%
1,333,333
100%
97%
84
84
10%
2,166,667
100%
98%
84
84
10%
2,166,667
100%
97%
84
84
10%
2,166,667
99%
94%
80
80
10%
1,333,333
1000/
970%
84
84
10A
2,166,667
96%
87%
72
72
20%
0
98%
93%
79
79
20%
8,190,274
97%
91%
77
77
20%
4,543,703
98%
94%
80
80
20%
9,072,917
99%
95%
81
81
20%
11,572,917
98%
93%
78
78
20%
7,372,319
98%
91%
77
77
20%
5,690,638
97%
89%
75
75
20%
2,941,054
98%
92%
7E
7E
20%
6,124,237
Figure B-3: Increasing Slope Payment Method, Ceiling and Floor at 25%
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NPV
0
6,419,986
3,563,379
7,463,842
9,363,523
5,639,740
4,329,796
2,178,367
4,752,636
Description
Base
Initial performance
level maintained for
all years
Steady I
yrs 1-5: 14
yr 6: 10
yr7:10
(90)
Steady 2
yrs 1-5: 9
yr 6: 10
yr7:10
(65)
Front-end I
yr 1: 40
yr 2: 25
yrs 3-7: 0
(65)
Front-end 2
yr 1: 40
yr 2: 25
yrs 3-7: 5
(90)
Back-end I
yrs 1-3: 5
yr 4: 25
yr 5: 40
yrs 6-7: 5
(90)
Back-end 2
yrs 1-3: 5
yr4: 15
yr 5-7: 20
(90)
Back-end 3
yrs 1-3: 0
yr 4: 5
yr 5-7: 20
(65)
Uneven i
yr 1: 20
yr 2: -5
yr 3: 10
yr 4: 25
(90)
yr 5: -10
yr 6: 30
yr 7: 20
Measure
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalyincentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
Year = 1 2 3
96%
87%
72
72
33%
0
97%
89%
74
74
33%
350,000
96%
88%
73
73
33%
225,000
98%
92%
77
77
33%
1,000,000
98%
92%
77
77
33%
1,000,000
96%
88%
73
73
33%
125,000
96%
88%
73
73
33%
125,000
96%
87%
72
72
33%
0
97%
89%
75
75
33%
500,000
96%
87%
72
72
28%
0
97%
90%
76
76
28%
564,516
97%
89%
74
74
28%
353,403
99%
94%
80
80
28%
1,406,250
99%
94%
80
80
28%
1,406,250
96%
88%
73
73
28%
192,308
96%
88%
73
73
28%
192,308
96%
87%
72
72
28%
0
97%
89%
74
74
28%
138,889
96%
87%
72
72
23%
0
98%
92%
77
77
23%
742,424
97%
90%
76
76
23%
443,662
99%
94%
80
80
23%
978,261
99%
95%
81
81
23%
1,195,652
97%
89%
74
74
23%
233,333
97%
89%
74
74
23%
233,333
96%
87%
72
72
23%
0
97%
90%
75
75
23%
357,143
5 6 7
96%
87%
72
72
18%
0
98%
93%
79
79
18%
934,164
97%
91%
77
77
18%
521,638
99%
94%
80
80
18%
750,000
99%
96%
82
82
18%
1,250,000
98%
92%
77
77
18%
821,678
97%
90%
76
76
18%
541,958
96%
88%
73
73
18%
125,000
98%
93%
79
79
18%
961,538
96%
87%
72
72
18%
0
98%
93%
79
79
18%
1,187,090
98%
92%
78
78
15%
601,812
99%
94%
80
80
15%
750,000
99%
96%
82
82
15%
1,500,000
99%
97%
83
83
15%
1,830,544
98%
93%
79
79
15%
931,373
97%
90%
75
75
15%
576,923
98%
92%
77
77
15%
214,286
96%
87%
72
72
15%
0
99%
95%
81
81
15%
1,500,000
98%
93%
79
79
13%
734,429
99%
94%
80
80
13%
750,000
99%
97%
83
83
13%
1,750,000
100%
97%
84
84
13%
1,750,000
99%
95%
81
81
13%
1,343,373
98%
92%
78
78
13%
905,797
99%
95%
81
81
13%
1,305,970
96%
87%
72
72
13%
0
99%
96%
82
82
13%
2,000,000
99%
94%
80
80
10%
890,342
99%
94%
80
80
10%
750,000
100%
97%
84
84
10%
2,000,000
100%
98%
84
84
10%
2,000,000
100%
97%
84
84
10%
2,000,000
99%
94%
80
80
10%
1,261,062
1000/
97%
84
84
100/
2,000,000
Figure B-4: Increasing Slope Payment Method, Ceiling and Floor at 50%
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Average/Sum
96%
87%
72
72
20%
a
98%
93%
79
79
20%
7,278,194
97%
91%
77
77
20%
3,770,28E
98%
94%
8C
8C
20%
6,384,511
99%
95%
81
81
20%
10,101,902
98%
93%
7E
78
20%
6,952,8&
98%
91%
77
77
20%
5,367,349
97%
89%
7r
7E
20%
2,868,782
980/
920/c
7E
7E
20%
5,477,826
NPV
0
5,726,040
2,999,565
5,370,294
8,191,647
5,332,554
4,094,472
2,127,005
4,265,536
Description
Base
Initial performance
level maintained for
all years
Steady I
yrs 1-5: 14
yr6: 10
yr7:10
(90)
Steady 2
yrs 1-5: 9
yr6: 10
yr7:10
(65)
Front-end I
yr 1: 40
yr 2: 25
yrs 3-7: 0
(65)
Front-end 2
yr 1: 40
yr 2: 25
yrs 3-7: 5
(90)
Back-end I
yrs 1-3: 5
yr 4: 25
yr 5: 40
yrs 6-7: 5
(90)
Back-end 2
yrs 1-3: 5
yr4: 15
yr 5-7: 20
(90)
Back-end 3
yrs 1-3: 0
yr4: 5
yr 5-7: 20
(65)
Uneven I
yr 1: 20
yr 2: -5
yr 3: 10
yr 4: 25
(90)
yr 5: -10
yr 6: 30
yr 7: 20
Measure
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketdess Travel
Penalty/incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
Year=1 2 3
96%
87%
72
72
33%
0
97%
89%
74
74
33%
350,000
96%
88%
73
73
33%
225,000
98%
92%
77
77
33%
1,000,000
98%
92%
77
77
33%
1,000,000
96%
88%
73
73
33%
125,000
96%
88%
73
73
33%
125,000
96%
87%
72
72
33%
0
97%
89%
75
75
33%
500,000
96%
87%
72
72
28%
0
97%
90%
76
76
28%
564,516
97%
89%
74
74
28%
353,403
99%
94%
80
80
28%
1,406,250
99%
94%
80
80
28%
1,406,250
96%
88%
73
73
28%
192,308
96%
88%
73
73
28%
192,308
96%
87%
72
72
28%
0
97%
89%
74
74
28%
138,889
96%
87%
72
72
23%
0
98%
92%
77
77
23%
742,424
97%
90%
76
76
23%
443,662
99%
94%
80
80
23%
978,261
99%
95%
81
81
23%
1,195,652
97%
89%
74
74
23%
233,333
97%
89%
74
74
23%
233,333
96%
87%
72
72
23%
0
97%
90%
75
75
23%
357,143
96%
87%
72
72
18%
0
98%
93%
79
79
18%
934,164
97%
91%
77
77
18%
521,638
99%
94%
80
80
18%
608,108
99%
96%
82
82
18%
1,071,429
98%
92%
77
77
18%
821,678
97%
90%
76
76
18%
541,958
96%
88%
73
73
18%
125,000
98%
93%
79
79
18%
961,538
5
96%
87%
72
72
18%
0
98%
93%
79
79
18%
1,187,090
98%
92%
78
78
15%
601,812
99%
94%
80
80
15%
346,154
99%
96%
82
82
15%
1,071,429
99%
97%
83
83
15%
1,830,544
98%
93%
79
79
15%
931,373
97%
90%
75
75
15%
576,923
98%
92%
77
77 81
15% 13%
214,286 1,305,970
Figure B-5: Increasing Slope Payment Method, Ceiling and Floor at 65%
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96%
87%
72
72
15%
0
99%
95%
81
81
15%
1,352,224
98%
93%
79
79
13%
734,429
99%
94%
80
80
13%
185,950
99%
97%
83
83
13%
1,428,571
100%
97%
84
84
13%
1,707,921
99%
95%
81
81
13%
1,343,373
98%
92%
78
78
13%
905,797
99%
95%
81
7
96%
87%
72
72
13%
0
99%
96%
82
82
13%
1,785,714
99%
94%
80
80
10%
890,342
99%
94%
80
80
10%
96,567
100%
97%
84
84
10%
1,785,714
100%
98%
84
84
10%
1,785,714
100%
97%
84
84
10%
1,972,817
99%
94%
80
80
10%
1,261,062
100%
97%
84
84
10%
1,961,279
Average/Sum
96%
87%
72
72
20%
0
98%
93%
79
7$
20%
6,916,132
97%
91%
77
77
20%
3,770,286
98%
94%
80
80
20%
4,621,290
99%
95%
81
81
20%
8,959,045
98%
93%
78
78
20%
6,696,498
98%
91%
77
77
20%
5,340,162
97%
89%
75
75
20%
2,868,782
98%
92%
78
78
20%
5,439,106
NPV
0
5,463,4791
2,999,565
4,051,849
7,316,796
5,148,865
4,075,154
2,127,005
4,238,018
Description
Base
Initial performance
level maintained for
all years
Steady I
yrs 1-5: 14
yr 6: 10
yr7:10
(90)
Steady 2
yrs 1-5: 9
yr 6: 10
yr7:10
(65)
Front-end I
yr 1: 40
yr 2: 25
yrs 3-7: 0
(65)
Front-end 2
yr 1: 40
yr 2: 25
yrs 3-7: 5
(90)
Back-end I
yrs 1-3: 5
yr 4: 25
yr 5: 40
yrs 6-7: 5
(90)
Back-end 2
yrs 1-3: 5
yr 4: 15
yr 5-7: 20
(90)
Back-end 3
yrs 1-3: 0
yr 4: 5
yr 5-7: 20
(65)
Uneven I
yr 1: 20
yr 2: -5
yr 3: 10
yr 4: 25
(90)
yr 5: -10
yr 6: 30
yr 7: 20
Measure
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
Year =1 2 3 4 5 6 7
96%
87%
72
72
33%
0
97%
89%
74
74
33%
1,664,706
96%
88%
73
73
33%
1,605,882
98%
92%
77
77
33%
1,970,588
98%
92%
77
77
33%
1,970,588
96%
88%
73
73
33%
1,558,824
96%
88%
73
73
33%
1,558,824
96%
87%
72
72
33%
0
97%
89%
75
75
33%
1,735,294
96%
87%
72
72
28%
0
97%
90%
76
76
28%
1,747,059
97%
89%
74
74
28%
1,658,824
99%
94%
80
80
28%
2,088,235
99%
94%
80
80
28%
2,088,235
96%
88%
73
73
28%
1,588,235
96%
88%
73
73
28%
1,588,235
96%
87%
72
72
28%
0
97%
89%
74
74
28%
1,558,824
96%
87%
72
72
23%
0
98%
92%
77
77
23%
1,817,647
97%
90%
76
76
23%
1,685,294
99%
94%
80
80
23%
2,088,235
99%
95%
81
81
23%
2,147,059
97%
89%
74
74
23%
1,602,941
97%
89%
74
74
23%
1,602,941
96%
87%
72
72
23%
0
97%
90%
75
96%
87%
72
72
18%
0
98%
93%
79
79
18%
1,982,353
97%
91%
77
77
18%
1,747,059
99%
94%
80
80
18%
2,088,235
99%
96%
82
82
18%
2,205,882
98%
92%
77
77
18%
1,845,588
97%
90%
76
76
18%
1,727,941
96%
88%
73
73
18%
1,558,824
98%
93%
79
96%
87%
72
72
18%
0
98%
93%
79
79
18%
2,147,059
98%
92%
78
78
15%
1,852,941
99%
94%
80
80
15%
2,088,235
99%
96%
82
82
15%
2,264,706
99%
97%
83
83
15%
2,264,706
98%
93%
79
79
15%
1,911,765
97%
90%
75
75
15%
1,764,706
98%
92%
77
96%
87%
72
72
15%
0
99%
95%
81
81
15%
2,264,706
98%
93%
79
79
13%
1,970,588
99%
94%
80
80
13%
2,088,235
99%
97%
83
83
13%
2,323,529
100%
97%
84
84
13%
2,323,529
99%
95%
81
81
13%
2,147,059
98%
92%
78
78
13%
1,867,647
99%
95%
81
96%
87%
72
72
13%
0
99%
96%
82
82
13%
2,382,353
99%
94%
80
80
10%
2,088,235
99%
94%
80
80
10%
2,088,235
100%
97%
84
84
10%
2,382,353
100%
98%
84
84
10%
2,382,353
100%
97%
84
84
10%
2,382,353
99%
94%
80
80
10%
2,088,235
75 79 77 81 84
23% 18% 15% 13% 10%
1,647,059 1,911,765 1,794,118 2,147,059 2,382,353
Figure B-6: Constant Slope Payment Method, Ceiling and Floor at 15%
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Average/Sum
96%
87%
72
7
20%
0
98%
93%
79
79
20%
14,005,882
97/
91%
77
77
20%
12,608,824
98%
94%
80
80
20%
14,500,000
99%
95%
81
81
20%
15,382,353
980
93%
78
78
20%
13,566,176
98%
91%
77
77
20%
12,919,118
97%
89%
75
75
20%
7,279,412
98%
92%
78
78
20%
13,176,471
NPV
0
11,436,435
10,333,525
11,971,264
12,641,740
11,029,624
10,524,612
5,542,878
10,763,165
100%
97%
84
Description
Base
Initial performance
level maintained for
all years
Steady I
yrs 1-5: 14
yr 6: 10
yr7:10
(90)
Steady 2
yrs 1-5: 9
yr 6: 10
yr7:10
(65)
Front-end 1
yr 1: 40
yr 2: 25
yrs 3-7: 0
(65)
Front-end 2
yr 1: 40
yr 2: 25
yrs 3-7: 5
(90)
Back-end I
yrs 1-3: 5
yr 4: 25
yr 5: 40
yrs 6-7: 5
(90)
Back-end 2
yrs 1-3: 5
yr 4: 15
yr 5-7: 20
(90)
Back-end 3
yrs 1-3: 0
yr 4: 5
yr 5-7: 20
(65)
Uneven I
yr 1: 20
yr 2: -5
yr 3: 10
yr 4: 25
(90)
yr 5: -10
yr 6: 30
yr 7: 20
Measure
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketiess Travel
Penalty/incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penaty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travell
Penalty/incentive
Year =1 2 3 4 5 6
96%
87%
72
72
33%
0
97%
89%
74
74
33%
1,678,431
96%
88%
73
73
33%
1,614,706
98%
92%
77
77
33%
2,009,804
98%
92%
77
77
33%
2,009,804
96%
88%
73
73
33%
1,563,725
96%
88%
73
73
33%
1,563,725
96%
87%
72
72
33%
0
97%
89%
75
75
33%
1,754,902
96%
87%
72
72
28%
0
97%
90%
76
76
28%
1,767,647
97%
89%
74
74
28%
1,672,059
99%
94%
80
80
28%
2,073,529
99%
94%
80
80
28%
2,073,529
96%
88%
73
73
28%
1,595,588
96%
88%
73
73
28%
1,595,588
96%
87%
72
72
28%
0
97%
89%
74
74
28%
1,563,725
96%
87%
72
72
23%
0
98%
92%
77
77
23%
1,812,255
97%
90%
76
76
23%
1,700,735
99%
94%
80
80
23%
2,009,804
99%
95%
81
81
23%
2,073,529
97%
89%
74
74
23%
1,611,520
97%
89%
74
74
23%
1,611,520
96%
87%
72
72
23%
0
97%
90%
75
75
23%
1,659,314
96%
87%
72
72
18%
0
98%
93%
79
79
18%
1,895,098
97%
91%
77
77
18%
1,715,074
99%
94%
80
80
18%
2,009,804
99%
96%
82
82
18%
2,137,255
98%
92%
77
77
18%
1,874,387
97%
90%
76
76
18%
1,746,936
96%
88%
73
73
18%
1,563,725
98%
93%
79
96%
87%
72
72
18%
0
98%
93%
79
79
18%
2,073,529
98%
92%
78
78
15%
1,754,902
99%
94%
80
80
15%
2,009,804
99%
96%
82
82
15%
2,200,980
99%
97%
83
83
15%
2,200,980
98%
93%
79
79
15%
1,878,370
97%
90%
75
75
15%
1,786,765
98%
92%
77
96%
87%
72
72
15%
0
99%
95%
81
81
15%
2,200,980
98%
93%
79
79
13%
1,882,353
99%
94%
80
80
13%
2,009,804
99%
97%
83
83
13%
2,264,706
100%
97%
84
84
13%
2,264,706
99%
95%
81
81
13%
2,073,529
98%
92%
78
78
13%
1,898,284
99%
95%
81
79 77 81
18% 15% 13%
1,898,284 1,691,176 2,073,529
7 I|Average/Sum F NPV
96%
87%
72
72
13%
0
99%
96%
82
82
13%
2,328,431
99%
94%
80
80
10%
2,009,804
99%
94%
80
80
10%
2,009,804
100%
97%
84
84
10%
2,328,431
100%
98%
84
84
10%
2,328,431
100%
97%
84
84
10%
2,328,431
99%
94%
80
80
10%
2,009,804
100%
97%
84
84
10%
2,328,431c
96%
87%
72
72
20%
0
98%
93%
79
79
20%
13,756,373
97%
91%
77
77
20%
12,349,632
98%
94%
80
80
20%
14,132,353
99%
95%
81
81
20%
15,088,235
98%
93%
78
78
20%
13,439,338
98%
91%
77
77
20%
12,798,100
97%
89%
71
75
20%
7,258,578
98%
92%
78
78
20%
12,969,363
0
11,248,253
10,142,559
11,687,277
12,413,626
10,939,919
10,439,632
5,531,317
10,611,934
Figure B-7: Constant Slope Payment Method, Ceiling and Floor at 25%
130
Description
Base
Initial performance
level maintained for
all years
Steady 1
yrs 1-5: 14
yr 6: 10
yr7:10
(90)
Steady 2
yrs 1-5: 9
yr6: 10
yr7:10
(65)
Front-end 1
yr 1: 40
yr 2: 25
yrs 3-7: 0
(65)
Front-end 2
yr 1: 40
yr 2: 25
yrs 3-7: 5
(90)
Back-end 1
yrs 1-3: 5
yr 4: 25
yr 5: 40
yrs 6-7: 5
(90)
Back-end 2
yrs 1-3: 5
yr 4: 15
yr 5-7: 20
(90)
Back-end 3
yrs 1-3: 0
yr 4: 5
yr 5-7: 20
(65)
Uneven I
yr 1: 20
yr 2: -5
yr 3: 10
yr 4: 25
(90)
yr 5: -10
yr 6: 30
yr 7: 20
Measure
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penaty/incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penaty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
Year =1 2 3 4 5 6 7
96%
87%
72
72
33%
0
97%
89%
74
74
33%
1,736,765
96%
88%
73
73
33%
1,652,206
98%
92%
77
77
33%
2,176,471
98%
92%
77
77
33%
2,176,471
96%
88%
73
73
33%
1,584,559
96%
88%
73
73
33%
1,584,559
96%
87%
72
72
33%
0
97%
89%
75
75
33%
1,838,235
96%
87%
72
72
28%
0
97%
90%
76
76
28%
1,855,147
97%
89%
74
74
28%
1,728,309
99%
94%
80
80
28%
2,261,029
99%
94%
80
80
28%
2,261,029
96%
88%
73
73
28%
1,626,838
96%
88%
73
73
28%
1,626,838
96%
87%
72
72
28%
0
97%
89%
74
74
28%
1,584,559
96%
87%
72
72
23%
0
98%
92%
77
77
23%
1,914,338
97%
90%
76
76
23%
1,766,360
99%
94%
80
80
23%
1,880,515
99%
95%
81
81
23%
1,965,074
97%
89%
74
74
23%
1,647,978
97%
89%
74
74
23%
1,647,978
96%
87%
72
72
23%
0
97%
90%
75
75
23%
1,711,397
96%
87%
72
72
18%
0
98%
93%
79
79
18%
1,943,934
97%
91%
77
77
18%
1,785,386
99%
94%
80
80
18%
1,753,676
99%
96%
82
82
18%
1,922,794
98%
92%
77
77
18%
1,996,783
97%
90%
76
76
18%
1,827,665
96%
88%
73
73
18%
1,584,559
98%
93%
79
79
18%
2,028,493
96%
87%
72
72
18%
0
98%
93%
79
79
18%
1,958,732
98%
92%
78
78
15%
1,794,899
99%
94%
80
80
15%
1,753,676
99%
96%
82
82
15%
2,007,353
99%
97%
83
83
15%
2,366,268
98%
93%
79
79
15%
2,002,068
97%
90%
75
75
15%
1,880,515
98%
92%
77
77
15%
1,595,129
96%
87%
72
72
15%
0
99%
95%
81
81
15%
2,007,353
98%
93%
79
79
13%
1,816,567
99%
94%
80
80
13%
1,753,676
99%
97%
83
83
13%
2,091,912
100%
97%
84
84
13%
2,091,912
99%
95%
81
81
13%
2,089,269
98%
92%
78
78
13%
2,028,493
96%
87%
72
72
13%
0
99%
96%
82
82
13%
2,176,471
99%
94%
80
80
10%
1,827,401
99%
94%
80
80
10%
1,753,676
100%
97%
84
84
10%
2,176,471
100%
98%
84
84
10%
2,176,471
100%
97%
84
84
10%
2,176,471
99%
94%
80
80
10%
2,102,482
99% 100%
95% 97%
81 84
81 84
13% 10%
2,054,917 2,176,471
Figure B-8: Constant Slope Payment Method, Ceiling and Floor at 50%
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Average/Sum
96%
87%
72
72
20%
0
98%
93%
79
79
20%
13,592,739
97%
91%
77
20%
12,371,128
98%
94%
80
80
20%
13,332,721
99%
95%
81
81
20%
14,601,103
98%
93%
78
78
20%
13,490,809
98%
91%
77
77
20%
12,954,848
97%
89%
75
75
20%
7,596,048
98%
92%
78
78
20%
12,989,200
NPV
0
11,169,103
10,196,447
11,119,840
12,083,649
11,012,865
10,586,399
5,784,940
10,665,1701
Description
Base
Initial performance
level maintained for
all years
Steady 1
yrs 1-5: 14
yr 6: 10
yr7:1 0
(90)
Steady 2
yrs 1-5: 9
yr 6: 10
yr7:10
(65)
Front-end I
yr 1: 40
yr 2: 25
yrs 3-7: 0
(65)
Front-end 2
yr 1: 40
yr 2: 25
yrs 3-7: 5
(90)
Back-end I
yrs 1-3: 5
yr 4: 25
yr 5: 40
yrs 6-7: 5
(90)
Back-end 2
yrs 1-3: 5
yr 4: 15
yr 5-7: 20
(90)
Back-end 3
yrs 1-3: 0
yr 4: 5
yr 5-7: 20
(65)
Uneven I
yr 1: 20
yr 2: -5
yr 3: 10
yr 4: 25
(90)
yr 5: -10
yr 6: 30
yr 7: 20
Measure
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
% Complete Trips
% On-time Trips
CSS Score
MSS Score
Ticketless Travel
Penalty/Incentive
Year=1 2 3 4 5 6 7
96% 96% 96% 96% 96% 96% 96%
87% 87% 87% 87% 87% 87% 87%
72 72 72 72 72 72 72
72 72 72 72 72 72 72
33%
0
97%
89%
74
74
33%
1,811,765
96%
88%
73
73
33%
1,700,420
98%
92%
77
77
33%
2,301,471
98%
92%
77
77
33%
2,301,471
96%
88%
73
73
33%
1,611,345
96%
88%
73
73
33%
1,611,345
96%
87%
72
72
33%
0
97%
89%
75
75
33%
1,945,378
28%
0
97%
90%
76
76
28%
1,967,647
97%
89%
74
74
28%
1,800,630
99%
94%
80
80
28%
2,323,529
99%
94%
80
80
28%
2,323,529
96%
88%
73
73
28%
1,667,017
96%
88%
73
73
28%
1,667,017
96%
87%
72
72
28%
0
97%
89%
74
74
28%
1,611,345
23%
0
98%
92%
77
77
23%
2,045,588
97%
90%
76
76
23%
1,850,735
99%
94%
80
80
23%
2,001,050
99%
95%
81
81
23%
2,112,395
97%
89%
74
74
23%
1,694,853
97%
89%
74
74
23%
1,694,853
96%
87%
72
72
23%
0
97%
90%
75
75
18%
0
98%
93%
79
79
18%
2,084,559
97%
91%
77
77
18%
1,875,788
99%
94%
80
80
18%
1,750,525
99%
96%
82
82
18%
1,917,542
98%
92%
77
77
18%
2,154,149
97%
90%
76
76
18%
1,931,460
96%
88%
73
73
18%
1,611,345
98%
93%
79
23% 1
1,778,361 2,195,9
18%
0
98%
93%
79
79
18%
2,104,044
98%
92%
78
78
15%
1,888,314
99%
94%
80
80
15%
1,625,263
99%
96%
82
82
15%
1,834,034
99%
97%
83
83
15%
2,366,268
98%
93%
79
79
15%
2,161,108
97%
90%
75
75
15%
2,001,050
98%
92%
77
15%
0
990/
95%
81
81
15%
2,024,711
98%
93%
79
79
13%
1,916,846
99%
94%
80
80
13%
1,562,631
99%
97%
83
83
13%
1,945,378
100%
97%
84
84
13%
2,220,260
99%
95%
81
81
13%
2,275,932
98%
92%
78
78
13%
2,195,903
99%
95%
81
13%
0
99%
96%
82
82
13%
2,056,723
99%
94%
80
80
10%
1,931,112
99%
94%
80
80
10%
1,531,316
100%
97%
84
84
10%
2,056,723
100%
98%
84
84
10%
2,056,723
100%
97%
84
84
10%
2,290,097
99%
94%
80
80
10%
2,282,169
100%
97%
84
79 77 81 84
8% 15% 13% 10%
03 1,625,263 2,230,699 2,285,616
Average/Sum
96%
87%
7
72
20%
0
98%
93%
79
79
20%
14,095,037
97%
91%
77
77
20%
12,963,846
98%
94%
80
80
20%
13,095,785
99%
95%
81
81
20%
14,491,071
98%
93%
76
78
20%
13,770,614
98%
91%
77
77
20%
13,631,811
97%
89%
75
75
20%
8,090,467
98%
920/c
7E
7E
200%
13,672, 564
Figure B-9: Constant Slope Payment Method, Ceiling and Floor at 65
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NPV
0
11,613,350
10,676,951
10,995,903
12,052,078
11,255,449
11,118,891
6,154,044
11,219,430
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List of Contracts
DfT Rail Template Franshise Agreement
GCA - 18th Invitation to Tender for ordinary bus services
London Transport Buses
Massachusetts Bay Transport Authority: Commuter Rail Operating Agreement
SRA - DfT Rail Template Franchise Agreement (old)
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